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Tiivistelmä – Abstract 
 
Epäkohteliaisuuden tutkiminen osana kohteliaisuuden tutkimusta on ollut muutaman viime vuosikymmenen aikana varsin suosittu 
sosiolingvistiikan osa-alue. Pääpaino on kuitenkin ollut epämuodollisen kielen tutkimuksessa. Epäkohteliaat ilmaisut ovat yleisimpiä 
tilanteissa, joissa puhuja on kiihtynyt, ja epäkohteliaisuutta onkin tutkittu esimerkiksi tosi-tv-sarjoissa, jotka sijoittuvat vaikkapa armeijaan 
tai ravintolan keittiöön (esimerkiksi Culpeper 1996, Culpeper et al. 2003, Bousfield 2008). 
 
Tämä tutkimus keskittyi epäkohteliaisuuteen muodollisemmassa kontekstissa, vaaliväittelyssä. Tutkimuksen aihe otti mallia Harrisin 
(2001) ja Garcia-Pastorin (2008) artikkeleista, ja perustui Culpeperin (1996) ja Bousfieldin (2008) listaamiin epäkohteliaisuusstrategioihin. 
Tavoitteena oli määritellä mitkä näistä strategioista olisivat käytössä ja istuisivat myös muodolliseen ympäristöön. Oletuksena oli, että 
kaikkia Culpeperin ja Bousfieldin määrittelemiä strategioita ei voida käyttää tässä kielen rekisterissä, mutta että osa strategioista soveltuu 
sekä epämuodollisiin että muodollisiin kielenkäyttötilanteisiin.  
 
Tutkimuksen aineisto koostui kolmesta puoluejohtajien vaaliväittelystä, jotka pidettiin Iso-Britanniassa keväällä 2010. Väittelyihin 
osallistuivat Työväenpuolueen, Konservatiivien ja Liberaalidemokraattien puoluejohtajat. Jokainen väittely oli 90 minuuttia pitkä. 
Kaikista väittelyistä oli käytettävissä sekä litteroitu dialogi että videotallenne.  
 
Aineistosta etsittiin ensin kaikki epäkohteliaat ilmaukset, jotka sitten luokiteltiin. Luokittelu perustui Culpeperin (1996) ja Bousfieldin 
(2008) tutkimusten pohjalta koottuun 20 strategian listaan. Lisäksi ilmaukset jaoteltiin jokaisen väittelijän mukaan. Tulokset arvioitiin 
sekä laadullisesti että määrällisesti.  
 
20 mahdollisen strategian joukosta aineistosta löytyi seitsemää eri kategoriaa edustavia ilmauksia. Ne olivat (itse suomennettuna): pyri 
erottautumaan toisista; pyri erimielisyyteen tai vältä yksimielisyyttä; alennu, halveksu, pilkkaa, käytä sarkasmia; yhdistä negatiiviseen 
piirteeseen ja henkilökohtaista; kritisoi; häiritse / estä; ja haasta. Lisäksi muutama ilmaus ei sopinut mihinkään alkuperäisistä 
kategorioista, ja ne merkittiin yhteisnimikkeellä sekalaiset.  Sekalaisen kategorian ilmaisut vaikuttivat samankaltaisilta, ja antavat alustavia 
viitteitä siihen, että epäkohteliaisuusstrategioiden listaan voisi mahdollisesti lisätä yhden uuden kategorian; vähättele. Aineistosta ei 
kuitenkaan löydy tarpeeksi tämän tyyppisiä ilmaisuja, jotta asia voitaisiin sanoa varmaksi. Kävi myös ilmi, että väittelijät suosivat eri 
strategioita. Tähän voi olla useita eri syitä, mutta vaikuttavia tekijöitä lienevät ainakin väittelijöiden väliset valtarakenteet ja jokaisen 
väittelijän omat väittelytaktiikat. Tutkimuksen tulokset viittaavat myös siihen, että muodollisessa tilanteessa esiintyvää epäkohteliaisuutta 
voidaan kuvata samojen strategioiden avulla joilla kuvataan epäkohteliaisuutta epämuodollisessa kontekstissa.  
 
Tämä tutkimus tarjosi silmäyksen kielitieteellisen epäkohteliaisuuden tutkimuksen vähemmän tutkittuun puoleen, epäkohteliaisuuteen 
muodollisessa kontekstissa, ja tässä tapauksessa myös poliittisen väittelyn kontekstissa. Vaikutti siltä, että väittelijät pysyivät 
hyödyntämään epäkohteliaisuusstrategioita omissa puheenvuoroissaan varsin mallikkaasti. Koska tämä tutkimus keskittyi ainoastaan 
yksittäisten strategioiden käyttöön, eikä käsitellyt ollenkaan esimerkiksi eri strategioiden yhdistelyä tai sitä, miten eri strategioita 
hyödynnetään yhden aihepiirin aikana. Täten voidaan sanoa, että jatkotutkimukselle on hyvät edellytykset.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In this pro gradu thesis I will look at the 2010 General Election debates (leaders’ debates) in 
the UK, in order to determine what kind of features of impoliteness can be found in the 
exchanges between the debaters. I am interested in the use of impoliteness in a more formal 
debate context and want to find out how the debaters convey their differing opinions and 
argue for their political views whilst adhering to the rules and conventions of a somewhat 
formal debate. I hope to define what kind of strategies, or are most common in a formal 
context. My hypothesis is that that due to the debate context certain impoliteness strategies, 
such as using taboo words or using obscure language will be ruled out, and other strategies, 
such as ignore, snub the other; condescend, scorn or ridicule; seek disagreement; criticise or 
hinder/block will highlight as more useful.  
 
Politeness and impoliteness have been studied quite a bit in recent years (see chapter 2), but 
the emphasis tends to be on informal language and contexts. This seems to be the natural 
habitat of impoliteness, but it does not mean that instances of impoliteness cannot be found 
amongst the more regulated interactions. In fact, many of the interactions in formal, especially 
political settings are based around confrontation and the interactants defending their differing 
views. My study will focus on the less studied formal context that is restricted by rules of 
conduct and thus limits the available strategies, which hopefully brings additional depth to the 
existing impoliteness theories.  
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The reason I chose this topic stems from having an interest towards how people communicate. 
I find it interesting that politeness and impoliteness are central in almost any form of 
communication. Especially in a case of differing opinions, the use or non-use of politeness 
and impoliteness strategies drastically shapes the nature of the conversation. In addition, I am 
intrigued by how the more formal context of communication restricts what can be said and 
how, and how skilled speakers can work within these restraints to convey their intended 
message.   
 
Possible limitations to this study arise from the extensive nature of the general topic. 
Im/politeness has become a very broad field over the last decade, and it has been studied in 
numerous contexts. I would have found it interesting to study the political debates from the 
joint perspective of im/politeness and power use, but that viewpoint would have been too 
wide for this particular study.   
 
The structure of this thesis will be divided into four chapters, the first one being the 
introduction. In the second chapter I will present the rather complicated nature of 
impoliteness. I will first talk about its general definitions, and then I will look into the use of 
impoliteness, both on a general level and in a political context. The third chapter is dedicated 
to introducing the data and the methods of the study, and in the fourth chapter I will analyse 
the data and discuss my findings.  
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2. What is impoliteness? 
 
“The quest for a ‘holy grail’ theory goes on.”  
 Bousfield (2008: 67) 
“[t]here is no solid agreement in the chapters as to what ‘impoliteness’ actually is.” 
 Locher and Bousfield (2008: 3) 
 
The general consensus about im/politeness theory at the moment seems to be that everyone 
agrees that politeness and impoliteness are incredibly difficult to define. Locher and Watts 
(2008: 3) do state that the “lowest common nominator, however, can be summarised like this: 
Impoliteness is behaviour that is face-aggravating in a particular context.” But what does this 
mean? And what do we know beyond this lowest common denominator? 
 
When the research first began, many researchers viewed linguistic impoliteness as something 
that can be directly derived from politeness theory, and/or that it is the opposite of politeness. 
Politeness, in turn, also has numerous definitions, a rather clear one coming from Locher: 
  
Politeness for the speaker: 
A polite utterance is a speaker’s intended, marked and appropriate behaviour which displays 
face concern; the motivation for it lies in the possibly, but not necessarily, egocentric desire of 
the speaker to show positive concern for the addressees and/or to respect the addressees’ and the 
speaker’s own need for independence. 
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Politeness for the addressee: 
Addressees will interpret an utterance as polite when it is perceived as appropriate and marked; 
the reason for this is understood as the speaker’s intention to show positive concern for the 
addressees’ face and/or the speaker’s intention to protect his or her own face needs. 
Locher (2004: 91) 
 
Returning to impoliteness, Leech (2005, quoted here from Bousfield 2008: 51) describes the 
model of politeness as “inevitably also a theory of impoliteness, since impoliteness is a non-
observance or violation of the constraints of politeness.” Similarly, Mills (2005) argues that 
impoliteness is “a break from the hypothesized norms of a community of practice.” As 
Bousfield (2008: 51) points out, while impoliteness cannot be considered to be the norm and 
the principal way of communication, it is nonetheless prevalent and central as a part of the 
range of human communication, and it has its own means and purposes.  
 
One of the problems in the politeness theory framework, from the impoliteness viewpoint, is 
that it assumes that polite behaviour is the goal in every linguistic context, and impoliteness is 
deviant and something the interlocutor wants to avoid. This, quite obviously, is not always the 
case. In conflict situations impoliteness is quite clearly the goal, as illustrated in, for instance, 
Bousfield’s data (2008).   
 
Many researchers feel that it is also important to differentiate between so called 1
st
 and 2
nd
 
degree (or order) impoliteness. This means making a distinction between what people 
(laymen) generally consider to be impolite (1
st
 degree impoliteness); “judgements by 
participants in the interaction in question” (Locher and Watts 2008: 79) and impoliteness as 
“a theoretical concept which is established by the researcher” (Garcia-Pastor 2008: 104). 
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Bousfield (2008: 71–73) states that in the broad sense impoliteness can be seen as the 
opposite of politeness, in the sense that if politeness seeks to mitigate FTAs (face threatening 
acts), impoliteness aims at communication that is purposefully conflictive. FTAs are 
unmitigated (when mitigation is required) and/or deliberately aggressive or otherwise 
heightened.  
 
Some researchers feel that the division between polite and impolite is not enough. For 
example, Lakoff (1989: 103, quoted here from Harris 2001: 453) divides linguistic behaviour 
into three categories; polite, non-polite and rude, the two latter forming a kind of impoliteness 
spectrum. Non-politeness is viewed as “behaviour that does not conform to politeness rules, 
used where the latter are not expected” and rudeness, in turn, as “behaviour that does not 
utilize politeness strategies where they would be expected, in such a way that the utterance 
can only be interpreted as intentionally and negatively confrontational” Similarly, Schneider 
(2012) makes a distinction between appropriate/polite and inappropriate and impolite/rude 
behaviour. Some researchers, such as Culpeper (2010), Schneider (2012) and Waters (2012) 
have taken a semantic interest in whether rude or impolite is the appropriate term, if they can 
be used interchangeably or if there is a continuum between them. In this study, I will use the 
term impolite, because that has been more extensively used when describing impoliteness 
strategies.   
 
Both politeness and impoliteness have been studied extensively in the recent years. The 
studies have been conducted since the 1970s, though in the beginning the focus was almost 
solely on politeness studies. Important early studies on politeness include the works of Lakoff 
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(1973), Grice (1975), Leech (1983), and Brown and Levinson (1978, modified in 1987). More 
recently, Watts (2003) has been a central figure on honing politeness theory. For a detailed 
review on the history of politeness studies, see, for example, Locher (2004: Ch. 4) and Locher 
and Bousfield (2008: Ch. 1). In the branch of impoliteness, early studies were conducted by 
Lachenicht (1980), Austin (1990) and Culpeper (1996). Especially Culpeper’s work has since 
been expanded, by Culpeper himself (2003 as Culpeper et al., 2005, 2010), Bousfield (2008), 
and Bousfield and Locher (2008). Recently, impoliteness studies have become more 
specified, with interests in the political context (Harris 2001, Mills 2005, Terkourafi 2008), 
semantics (Culpeper 2011, Schneider 2012, Waters 2012), argumentation and disagreements 
(Robles 2011, Bigi and Morasso 2012, Sifianou 2012) and face (Spencer-Oatey 2007, 
Bayraktaroğlu and Sifianou 2012), to name but a few viewpoints. 
 
2.1 Early studies: Grice 
 
The cooperative principle is considered to be one of the founding elements of many of the 
original politeness theories, such as that of Brown and Levinson (1987) and of Leech (1983). 
Bousfield (2008: 21–31), however, argues that Grice’s theories have been, to a certain extent, 
misunderstood and some of the criticism aimed at it (for example, Watts 2003) stems from 
these misunderstandings.  
 
Grice is, in the im/politeness context, best known for his Cooperative Principle (CP) (1975), 
which is also closely linked to politeness and impoliteness theories (for instance, Brown and 
Levinson 1987 and Bousfield 2008). His view is that conversations between people are, at 
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least to a certain degree, cooperative efforts, and that each participant of the conversation 
recognises certain common goals. These goals lead up to the Communicative Principle (Grice, 
1975: 44-47), which he divides into four categories; maxims of quantity, quality, relation and 
manner, as follows: 
 
The maxim of quantity:  
1. Make your contribution as informative as required (for the purpose of the 
exchange) 
2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required 
Maxim of quality: Try to make your contribution one that is true 
1. Do not say what you believe to be false  
 2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence 
 Maxim of Relation: Be relevant 
 Maxim of Manner: Be perspicuous 
 1. Avoid obscurity of expression  
 2. Avoid ambiguity 
 3. be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity) 
 4. be orderly. 
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Grice (1975: 49) also pointed out that in discourse people often transgress from the 
expectations and the implied common goal of the conversation. This transgression can 
manifest in several ways. The interlocutor might, for example, violate a maxim, which can 
lead to misunderstandings, or he or she could opt out of a maxim, indicating that they are not 
going to cooperate in the way the maxims require. There could also be a clash, if the 
interactant is unable to fulfil a maxim. Or, finally, they might flout, blatantly fail to fulfil it. 
 
Bousfield (2008: 24–25) feels that Grice is often misinterpreted. He argues that because 
Grice’s theory is quite loose, and especially in 1975 still developing, the terms in the paper 
are rather ambiguous. Especially the terms ‘cooperative’ and ‘conversational cooperation’ 
have gained several different interpretations.  Of these maxims, Bousfield argues that ignoring 
or violating the maxim of Manner is rather an efficient tool for impoliteness.  
 
Fetzer (2002: 185) argues that within communication but especially within political speech 
validity and credibility of the interlocutors are central concepts, which derive from Grice’s 
quality maxim. She points out that this is not solely linked to an individual, but an audience 
that truly evaluates the credibility required. This is why this aspect makes it very interesting 
from the viewpoint of impoliteness in political speech. For example, in a debate, I would 
argue that the goal of the debaters is to heighten the audience’s trust in themselves and 
weaken the credibility of the opponents, and this might be seen as a driving force behind 
intentional impoliteness. 
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2.2. Im/politeness and face  
 
Goffman (1967: 5) defines face as “an image of self delineated in terms of social attributes - 
albeit an image others may share”. Face is also an important concept in the im/politeness 
theories of Brown and Levinson (1987), and Culpeper (1996, 2005), where they make a 
distinction between positive face and negative face. Positive face refers to the wants of an 
individual to be approved of or to be a part of a group, and negative face reflects the person’s 
wants to be respected as an individual (Cutting 2002: 45–46).  
 
Brown and Levinson’s face theory is often criticised for being too western a view. For 
example, the researchers in Japanese and Chinese cultures have argued that the concept of 
negative face does not exist in their cultures. Bousfield responds to this criticism by saying 
that some of these researchers may have misinterpreted the concept(s), and that there may be 
different emphases in different cultures on whether the positive or negative face strategies are 
prominent in the culture, but that both aspects are nonetheless present  (Bousfield 2008: 35–
37). However, he also states that Locher (2004) has argued that Brown and Levinson’s 
concept of face as a “public self-image” implies that it entails actually two concepts, an 
external and an internal one. These two are, according to Locher, mixed in Brown and 
Levinson’s research.  
 
A solution to the issues presented by the critics of Brown and Levinson’s theory lies, 
according to Bousfield (2008: 34–36), in O’Driscoll’s (1996, quoted here from Bousfield 
2008) concept of dualism to face.  According to O’Driscoll, in addition to positive and 
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negative face there are also basic positive and negative  ‘wants’ - “the need to come together, 
make contact and identify with others; to have ties; to belong; to merge” and “the need to go 
off alone, avoid contact and be individualised; to be independent; to separate”. He also 
argues, stemming from the views of Brown and Levinson (1987: 17–18), that utterances can 
range from slightly to very positively or negatively polite. Bousfield (2008: 35) finds the view 
useful, but comments on the problem that O’Driscoll’s views leave a lot of room for 
interpretation. Many have considered his theory to mean that while there is a scalar range in 
strength of positive and negative politeness, the positive and negative face wants are not to be 
found in a scalar relation, but they are dichotomous, or even polar opposites. Bousfield (2008: 
36) argues that this idea of dichotomy of positive/negative face should be abandoned, because 
he feels and demonstrates that “positive and negative face oriented utterances can co-occur 
within a single utterance”.  
 
Terkourafi (2008) presents a slightly different view of the face theory, stating that the face is 
solely external, and exists purely in interaction. Face is not ‘gained’ or ‘lost’ in a 
conversation, but it is something that exists within the interaction, where it is enhanced (or 
‘constituted’) or damaged. For Terkourafi, every interaction contains the concept of face, 
which is built and maintained during a conversation. Bousfield (2008: 39–40) agrees on this 
latter point, but challenges Terkourafi’s view of face existing only within a conversation. 
Bousfield argues that each interlocutor does bring something concerning their own face wants 
and needs to the conversation, namely their expectations on how their face should be 
constituted. He states that these expectations are brought to the conversation by an individual, 
based on the interlocutor’s sense of self-worth and his or her understanding of the context of 
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the conversation. Reflecting Goffman’s and de Kadt’s theories, Bousfield explains that face is 
mutually constructed in a conversation:  
“when the reality of the socially and internationally constituted face differs markedly from the 
individual’s (internal and cognitive) expectation of how their face should be constituted – 
especially where face is constituted at a somewhat ‘lower’ level that expected – then things can 
really get interesting: tensions  can ensue requiring, perhaps, remedial face/politeness work, an 
individual’s reassessment of their standing in society in relation to their feeling of self-worth 
including a defence of their expectations in an attempt to bring actual face in line with the 
expected, or an attack on a threatener’s face or other, similar ‘repositioning’. In short, face 
expectations not matching face reality may well result, amongst other things, in the 
communication, manipulation or management of impoliteness or aggression, linguistic or 
otherwise.”  
(Bousfield, 2008: 40, original emphasis) 
 
2.3. Culpeper’s model of impoliteness and Bousfield’s modifications of the theory 
 
There are three early models of impoliteness, Lachenicht’s (1980), Austin’s (1990) and 
Culpeper’s (1996). They have their similarities, especially the fact that they are all based on 
the politeness theory of Brown and Levinson (1987, though the first version was published in 
1978), but they also differ from each other. Of the three, Culpeper’s paper seems to be the 
most quoted one, and it is also the one that has been rather frequently expanded upon and 
updated since 1996.  
 
Bousfield (2008: 82) describes Austin’s theory as something that focuses on the interpretation 
and perception of impoliteness, and the role of the speaker is undermined. Culpeper et al. 
(2003), however, point out that, in contrast, the role of the hearer and the context are under-
represented in Brown and Levinson’s theory. They also remark that the fact that Austin’s 
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theory is not tested on real language but it solely relies on the researcher’s examples is a 
hindrance to the theory. 
 
Bousfield (2008: 83) notes that at first glance Lachenicht’s and Culpeper’s theories appear 
quite similar. He also states that Culpeper was not aware of Lachenicht’s theory when he 
wrote his 1996 paper. Lachenicht (1980, quoted here from Bousfield 2008: 83) describes 
impoliteness as “aggravating language” that is used with the intent to “hurt” the addressee, 
whereas Culpeper (1996) defines impoliteness as the kind of linguistic behaviour that attacks 
the hearer and aims to cause disharmony and/or social disruption. In addition, they refer to 
(though in different terms) the addressee’s positive and negative face wants as the target of 
impoliteness. The differences between the two theories, according to Bousfield, come from 
the “architecture” of the models. Essentially, they categorise impoliteness slightly differently 
and group the strategies in different ways, but still it is clear that they are along the same 
lines. Bousfield (2008: 89) criticises Lachenicht’s theory on being inconsistent and 
speculative in nature, and that, similarly to Austin, no examples based on real speech are 
provided. However, he gives the model credit for considering the possibility that different 
face aggravating strategies can be mixed, a point which he also talks about extensively (more 
on the topic below).  
 
Culpeper (see, for instance, 1996, 2003, 2010) first approached impoliteness studies by 
contrasting politeness and impoliteness. He stemmed from Brown and Levinson’s (1987) 
politeness study and categories in order to conjure his own impoliteness theory. He argued 
that whereas B&L aim to find communicative strategies that maintain or promote social 
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harmony, Culpeper concentrated on strategies that have the effect of social disruption.  In his 
article (1996), Culpeper points out that there are factors, such as social distance and power 
relations between the interlocutors, which create circumstances where the motivation to 
maintain social harmony is reduced. The participant who has more power has also more 
freedom to be impolite, and thus impoliteness is more likely to occur in situations where there 
is an imbalance of power, a point which is evident also in Bousfield’s study (2008). 
Interestingly, in the data I am using in this thesis the situation is quite contrastive, as the 
power is divided rather equally between the debaters, yet there are clear occurrences of 
impoliteness. One of the explanations for this could be that even though the debaters are of 
similar power in the debate, within politics the incumbent Prime Minister has more power, 
and the other two debaters are challenging that. I will discuss this point further in the analysis 
section.  
 
Culpeper (1996: 352) also differentiates between impoliteness and mock impoliteness. The 
latter, also referred to as banter, is impoliteness on the surface level only, as it is not really 
intended to hurt anyone’s feelings. Quoting Leech (1983), Culpeper explains that the purpose 
of banter is to reflect and foster social intimacy. Intimacy and the importance of politeness 
within communication are inversely proportional; the closer the interlocutors are, the less 
need there is for formal politeness. Culpeper adds to this by pointing out that this is mostly 
true in contexts where the impoliteness is clearly understood to be untrue. Interestingly, 
Culpeper also points out that impoliteness, a step further from lack of politeness, is even more 
likely to be interpreted as banter in non-intimate contexts: “[t]he more people like each other, 
the more concern they are likely to have for each other’s face. Thus, insults are more likely to 
be interpreted as banter when directed at targets liked by the speaker” (Culpeper 1996: 353). 
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Culpeper (1996: 355–358) introduces impoliteness strategies, which derive from Brown and 
Levinson’s (1987) politeness strategies. He opposes the politeness strategies and super-
strategies, so that they do not enhance or support but are aimed at attacking face. The 
impoliteness super-strategies are:  
(1) Bald on record impoliteness: the FTAs performed are “direct, clear, unambiguous” 
For example:  
S1:  we’ll start with you madam <to S4> I work for T F M parking 
okay 
S2: has made no attempt to respond 
S3:    excuse me excuse me you are 
S4: 
S1: I did the first time I met you  okay where’s your car 
S2: 
S3: a parking attendant alright act like one okay shut up and act like a parking 
attendant 
S4: 
(from Culpeper et al.: 2003: 1556) 
(2) Positive impoliteness: strategies are used to damage the addressee’s positive face wants.  
(3) Negative impoliteness: strategies are used to damage the addressee’s negative face wants.  
(4) Sarcasm or mock politeness: the FTA is performed by the use of politeness strategies and 
is obviously insincere. 
(5) Withhold politeness: the absence of politeness work in contexts where it is expected.  
Culpeper also points out that the formula for assessing the weightiness of an FTA that Brown 
and Levinson created for politeness research is also useful when evaluating impoliteness: “the 
more powerful and distant the other is, the more face-damaging the act is likely to be.” 
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In addition to super-strategies, Culpeper (1996: 357–358) has created counterstrategies for the 
output strategies of Brown and Levinson (1987), which intend to satisfy “the strategic ends of 
a super-strategy.” Culpeper emphasises that the list he has created is not exhaustive, and the 
impoliteness of the strategies greatly depends on the context.  
Positive impoliteness output strategies: 
- Ignore, snub the other:  fail to acknowledge the other’s presence.  
- Exclude the other from an activity 
- Disassociate from the other: for example, deny association or common ground with 
the other; avoid sitting together. 
- Be disinterested, unconcerned, unsympathetic 
- Use inappropriate identity markers: for example, use title and surname when a close 
relationship pertains, or a nickname when a distant relationship pertains.  
- Use obscure or secretive language: for example, mystify the other with jargon, or use 
a code known to others in the group, but not the target.  
- Seek disagreement: select a sensitive topic.  
- Make the other feel uncomfortable: for example, do not avoid silence, joke, or use 
small talk.  
- Use taboo words: swear, or use abusive or profane language.  
- Call the other names: use derogatory nominations.  
etc.  
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Negative impoliteness output strategies:  
- Frighten: install a belief that action detrimental to the other will occur.  
- Condescend, scorn or ridicule: emphasize your relative power. Be contemptuous. Do 
not take the other seriously. Belittle the other (e.g. use diminutives). 
- Invade the other’s space: literally (e.g. position yourself closer to the other than the 
relationship permits) or metaphorically (e.g. ask for or speak about information which 
is too intimate given the relationship). 
- Explicitly associate with a negative aspect - personalize, use pronouns ‘I’ and ‘you’.  
- Put the other’s indebtedness on record.  
etc.  
 
Bousfield (2008: 125–132) states that in his data there were some utterances that do not fit 
within these strategies. As Culpeper (1996) has left his lists of strategies open-ended, 
Bousfield suggests some new or modified strategies:  
- Seek disagreement -strategy could benefit from an addendum of Avoid agreement. 
- Frighten could be combined and supported with another strategy, Threaten. 
- Criticise - “dispraise h, some action or inaction by h, or some entity which h has 
invested face.” 
- Hinder/block - “physically (block passage), communicatively (deny turn, interrupt)” 
- Enforce role shift  
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- Challenge - “ask h a challenging question, question h’s position, stance, beliefs, 
assumed power, rights, obligations, ethics, etc.” 
Bousfield (2008: 125–132) 
In addition to these, Bousfield (2008: 137, quoting Culpeper 1996 and Jay 1992) points out 
that there are other actions, such as shouting, that can also convey impoliteness.  
 
Culpeper, Bousfield and Wichmann (2003) report that many researchers criticise Culpeper’s 
(1996) article on taking too narrow an approach to the impoliteness theory and single 
impoliteness strategies, and aim to expand those. They respond to the (other researchers’) 
criticism that questions the necessity of Culpeper’s (1996) impoliteness framework, claiming 
that since Brown and Levinson’s politeness framework already contains the ‘bald on record’ 
option, which can be interpreted to include the impolite. Culpeper et al (2003) argue that that 
is not enough, first of all because Brown and Levinson’s definition of the bald on record 
strategy is not comprehensive, and because not all impolite instances fit under the definition 
of bald on record. Thus, they state: “It is clear that bald on record does not adequately 
describe the variety of phenomena, including impoliteness phenomena, that can be – and have 
been by many researchers – placed within it” (Culpeper et al, 2003: 1548). Often the impolite 
utterance is not the most direct option available, and does not fulfil the Grice’s maxim of 
quality. For example, saying “You have shit for brains” carries the same core meaning as 
“You fool!”, but the former is both less polite and less direct than the latter (Culpeper et al, 
2003: 1549, original example). The researchers do point out (ibid, 1549, quoting Leech 1983) 
that this kind of correlation between indirectness and im/politeness does not apply to all cases 
of im/politeness and other factors, such as taboo words, also play an important role. However, 
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this example does illustrate why the category of bald on record is not sufficient and justifies 
the need for an impoliteness framework. Another interesting point about directness in regards 
to im/politeness is, once again, context. The intention of an utterance is key. For example, 
criticism of a paper is less likely to be interpreted as impoliteness if the critique derives from 
a tutor or a professor to a student. To make communication even more complicated, 
identifying speaker intention is notoriously difficult (Culpeper et al, 2003: 1549–1550). 
 
Another criticism of Culpeper’s (1996) work is voiced by Bousfield (2008 90–91). While he 
praises Culpeper’s theory on being the most widely tested on natural speech data and 
considers it to be a useful tool for analysing impolite interactions, he also points out that 
Culpeper has left his impoliteness categories (intentionally) open-ended, which is a good 
thing in the sense that it makes it adaptable and thus useful over a long period of time even if 
the field changes, but that it is also a weakness since the number of strategies that could be 
added to the list is possibly infinite. Still, this model with its modifications seems to currently 
be the best one available. Bousfield (2008: 94–95) also proposes a slight modification to the 
Culpeper (1996) and Culpeper et al. (2003) theory by simplifying it to “two overarching 
‘tactics’: 
 1. On-record impoliteness: 
The use of strategies designed to explicitly (a) attack the face of an interactant, 
(b) construct the face of an interactant in non-harmonious or outright conflictive 
way, (c) deny the expected face wants, needs or rights of the interactant, or some 
combination thereof. The attack is made in an unambiguous way given the 
context in which it occurs.” 
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2. Off-record impoliteness: 
The use of strategies where the threat or damage to an interactant’s face is 
conveyed indirectly by way of implicatures (cf. Grice [1975] 1989) and can be 
cancelled (e.g., denied or an account / post modification / elaboration / offered, 
etc.) but where “…one attributable intention clearly outweighs any others” 
(Culpeper 2005: 44), given the context in which it occurs.  
Sarcasm and the Withholding of Politeness where it is expected would also 
come under this heading, as follows:  
 (a) Sarcasm: 
Sarcasm constitutes the use of individual or combined strategies 
which, on the surface, appear to be appropriate but which are 
meant to be taken as meaning the opposite in terms of face-
management. The utterance that appears, on the surface, to 
positively constitute, maintain, or enhance the face of the intended 
recipient(s) actually threatens, attacks and/or damages the face of 
the recipient(s) (see Culpeper 2005) given the context in which it 
occurs. 
(b) Withhold politeness: 
More specifically, withhold politeness where politeness would 
appear to be expected or mandatory. 
 (Bousfield, 2008: 95) 
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2.3.1. Types of face threat 
 
Bousfield (2008: 67–70) wishes to differentiate impoliteness from other types of linguistic 
offence. He utilises Goffman’s (1967: 14, quoted here from Bousfield 2008: 67–70) 
definitions of three types of actions which constitute a threat to face: the intentional threat, the 
incidental threat and the accidental threat. Bousfield sees the intentional threat as overt 
impoliteness; the speaker aims at aggravating the face of the recipient, and there is a clear 
intention to be maximally offensive. Incidental threat, in turn, often stems from 
disagreements. The speaker’s intention is not face damage, but it is often an anticipated by-
product.  The face threat is a part of an action that is most likely done in spite of the offensive 
consequences, but not out of spite for the recipient. In these instances, the speaker can show 
that s/he understands the potential offensive consequences of the interlocution, and soften the 
disagreement with statements such as “I understand what your point is, but…” or “I can’t 
allow that, because…” Thus, the speaker uses positive politeness. Finally, there is the 
accidental face threat. This is a situation where the threat was not intentional, but a result from 
a faux pas such as asking an overweight woman when her baby is due. In addition to these, 
Bousfield argues that there are instances where the speaker’s intentions are unclear. He uses 
an example from his data to illustrate this problem: 
[…] 
S1: that’s right I clamped your car sir and I won’t dispute that fact that I 
S2: 
S1: clamped your car   well that’s fine by me if 
S2:  well end of conversation  
S1: you don’t have to talk we don’t have to talk 
S2: 
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According to Bousfield, an outsider cannot know for sure if S2’s utterance was intended as an 
intentional aggravation or if he just grew tired of the discussion and decided to leave in spite 
of it having potential offensive consequences.  
 
2.3.2. Speaker intention 
 
The example above relies heavily on speaker intention, which is the basis for the entire field 
of pragmatics. It is also a central part of politeness and impoliteness theories (Bousfield 2008: 
73). The problem with trying to decipher speaker intention is that it will always remain 
guesswork. Culpeper et al. (2003: 1552) state that while reconstructing actual intentions of a 
speaker can prove to be impossible, adequate evidence can help researchers deduce 
‘plausible’ intentions. Similarly, Mooney (2004: 900–901) suggests that intention is, first of 
all reconstructed and not retrieved, and that it is often based on previous information the 
hearer has, from, for example, past encounters or knowledge of social roles. She (ibid) also 
points out that even this might not be enough: 
Consider I intend to insult someone. If they are not insulted, my intention has not been realised. 
There are two possibilities here in terms of retrieval of intention. It may be possible to see in my 
utterance a potential insult (that the particular recipient has failed to note); but it also should be 
possible to see how the recipient failed to notice it. That is, analysis should be able to account 
for both possibilities (given that the recipient is competent in the language of interaction and so 
forth). What matters is not my intention to insult, but whether or how an insult is present in my 
utterance. In the same way, it is possible that I insult someone unwittingly; without intending to. 
Here too, what I intended and what the recipient perceived should both be accounted for. 
 
(Mooney 2004: 901) 
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Bousfield (2008: 72–73) follows the same reasoning. He notes that for impoliteness to be 
successful, it must be understood by the recipient. Thus, if only one of the (usually) two 
participants intends or perceives a face-threat, impoliteness is not successful. In other words:  
- Impoliteness is successful if the speaker intends to be impolite and the hearer correctly 
interprets what they hear as impolite.  
- If the speaker intends face-damage but this intent is not perceived, the attempt at 
impoliteness fails. 
- If the hearer interprets something the speaker says as intentionally face-damaging 
even if that was not the case, there is a case of accidental impoliteness, which might 
be caused by rudeness (Bousfield defines this as inadequate levels of politeness) or 
insensitivity on behalf of the speaker, or hypersensitivity by the hearer; “a clash of 
expectations, a cultural misunderstanding; misidentification (by the speaker or the 
hearer) of the Community of Practice or Activity type in which they are engaged”; or 
some combination of these, or some other reason altogether.    
- If the speaker does not intend to be impolite but the hearer interprets their message as 
unintentionally face-damaging, there might be a case of incidental or accidental face-
damage. The causes are similar to accidental impoliteness. 
 
2.3.3. Aggression 
 
Bousfield (2008: 75) describes aggression as “the one, lowest and most common denominator 
to such phenomena as ‘conflict’ or ‘confrontation’ which underlie impoliteness.” He also 
considers Hydén’s (1995, quoted here from Bousfield 2008: 76) division into two varieties, 
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verbal aggression and physical violence central to the definition. Bousfield wonders about the 
purpose of aggression, viewing the explanations of Hydén, who thinks that aggression serves 
as “a tactic for reaching a certain goal” (1995, quoted from Bousfield 2008: 76), and Yllö 
(1993, quoted from Bousfield 2008: 76), who finds it to be a means to attain or maintain 
power, as well as Straus and Gelles (1990, quoted from Bousfield 2008: 76), who see 
aggression as a conflict tactic, and considers that all these elements should be extended to be 
about verbal aggression as well, since “[i]t would be counterintuitive to consider that verbal 
aggression occurred solely for its own sake.” He also notes that in some contexts aggression 
can be seen as “a possible response to a frustrating incident, object, individual, or other 
phenomena” (2008: 78). He concludes that  
“[I]n response to an offending event, feelings of frustration could be triggered in 
an interlocutor. In turn, this could lead to the expression of some form of 
instrumental verbal aggression, for example, impoliteness. Such a speech act 
could, itself, be seen as a triggering, offending event and could, in turn, lead to 
the expression of new impoliteness.” 
(Bousfield 2008: 81) 
This is an interesting point. Verbal aggression is often a central part of impoliteness, 
especially in an informal context. However, once again it is necessary to question how well 
this applies to the more formal contexts. The factors that trigger impoliteness in, for example, 
a debate may vary. I expect to find instances of equally intentional expressions of 
impoliteness in my data, but it will be interesting to see what kind of responses they elicit. 
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2.3.4. Implicational impoliteness 
 
Culpeper (2010: Ch. 5) also argues that not every instance of impoliteness follows the 
conventional formulae. He offers three categories: 
(1) Form-driven: “the surface form or semantic content of a behaviour is 
marked.” Methods include insinuations, innuendos, casting aspersions, digs, 
snide comments/remarks, and so on. 
(2) Convention driven: Includes phenomena such as sarcasm, teasing, and 
certain types (harsh/bitter) of humour and jokes.  
(a) Internal: “the context is projected by part of a behaviour 
mismatches that projected by another part”; or 
(b) External: “the context projected by a behaviour mismatches the 
context of use.” 
(3) Context-driven: “impoliteness interpretation is primarily driven by the strong 
expectations flowing from the context” (p. 180) 
(a) Unmarked behaviour: “an unmarked (with respect to surface 
form or semantic content) and unconventionalised behaviour 
mismatches the context”; or 
(b) Absence of behaviour: “the absence of a behaviour mismatches 
the context.” 
While I agree that this more subtle branch of impoliteness is important to acknowledge, I also 
wish to highlight that the different elements of implicational impoliteness also already fit 
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within Culpeper’s (1996) and Bousfield’s (2008) impoliteness strategies, and within 
Bousfield’s (2008: 94–95) definition of off-record impoliteness.  
 
2.4. Impoliteness in discourse 
 
In addition to singular utterances and single politeness or impoliteness strategies, impoliteness 
can also be realised in extended discourse.  (Harris 2001, Bousfield 2008). In fact, Culpeper et 
al (2003: 1561) and Bousfield (2008: 146–167) point out that this, paired with mixing several 
impoliteness strategies, is a more common realisation of impoliteness than singular utterances 
using one specific strategy.  The offending interlocutor might use the same strategy repeatedly 
in order to form a parallelism, in order to boost the challenge and thus intensify the threat. 
Alternatively, one particular strategy can be used in combination with other strategies. 
Different strategies mutually boost one another and boost impoliteness.  
 
2.4.1. Triggering impoliteness: impoliteness in conversation beginnings, middles and 
ends 
 
Bousfield (2008: 183–) argues that “[i]mpoliteness does not exist in a vacuum and it does not 
in normal circumstances just spring ‘out of the blue’”. Context, as discussed above, plays a 
central role. Impoliteness is often triggered by an “offending event”, which creates feelings of 
“frustration, anger, annoyance, or similar”, which result in occurrences of impoliteness. 
However, he also wishes to clarify that impoliteness is not the only possible response to these 
events.  In addition to triggering events, Bousfield states that further triggering events can be 
located within a conversation. Locher (2004) describes argument sequences where 
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interlocutors prompt each other to keep the insults flowing. Similarly, Garcia-Pastor (2008: 
110–111) describes face aggravating strategies yielding positive and negative face 
aggravating moves as negativity cycles: 
 
Such moves did not necessarily correspond with a turn a talk. Rather, they consisted of a 
juxtaposition of impoliteness strategies constituting a coherent and identifiable chunk of speech 
by virtue of the overall aggravating function they performed as regards the opponent’s positive 
and negative face. Negativity cycles sporadically contained direct and explicit face mitigation 
targeted at the moderator of the exchange, the audience or the rival, which was issued for 
strategic purposes linked to the speaker’s (S) own image building in the case of the latter. These 
macro impolite units took place at any point in the unfolding event, frequently resulting in illicit 
talk that the moderator ended up stopping most of the time.  
(Garcia-Pastor 2008: 110) 
 
Garcia-Pastor also explains that these negativity cycles show impoliteness as highly 
aggressive. It will be interesting to see if any can be found in my data.  Since I hypothesise 
impoliteness to be less overtly aggressive in a more formal, political context, but at the same 
time the debate forum might be an ideal place for these negativity cycles, they might be 
apparent but possibly in a different form.  
 
Culpeper et al. (2003: 1562) point out that an important aspect that has not been studied very 
widely is the hearers’ responses to impoliteness. These are instances of impoliteness mid-
conversation, Harris (1986, quoted here from Culpeper et al. 2003: 1562) has appointed two 
basic pairs of impolite exchanges, OFFENSIVE-DEFENSIVE and OFFENSIVE-
OFFENSIVE. This means, theoretically, that when a person receives an FTA, they have two 
choices: to respond or not respond (i.e. stay silent) to the threat. Bousfield (2008: 188) 
considers there to be numerous explanations on the strategy of not responding. In addition to 
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Thomas’ (1995, quoted here from Bousfield) reason of deliberately being offensive by not 
speaking when there is an expectation to speak, or Culpeper’s (1996, quoted here from 
Bousfield) reason of refusing to respond when there is an expectation to be polite, Bousfield 
includes the reasons of “(a) the participant not hearing the content of the utterance of one’s 
interlocutor, (b) accepting the FTA; or (c) simply not having understood the content of the 
utterance of one’s interlocutor, amongst others” (2008: 188). This brings us back to the 
question of intent, and the successfulness of impoliteness. Bousfield argues that not only does 
staying silent have many reasons behind it, it is also quite difficult to study, and it is difficult 
to analyse whether the silence has any impolite strategizing behind it (ibid).  
 
Culpeper et al. (2003: 1562) state that those who choose to respond have further choices, 
either accepting the face attack or countering it. The former means, for instance, assuming 
responsibility for the occurrence of the impoliteness act in the first place by apologising.  
Similarly, an interlocutor might accept criticism by agreeing with it (Bousfield 2008: 193). 
The latter, in turn, can lead to an offensive or defensive counter strategy. Offensive strategies 
mean countering face attacks with face attacks, and defensive strategies mean that the 
interlocutor aims to defend his or her own face by attempting to deflect, block or in some 
other way manage the face attack (Culpeper et al., 2003: 1562). Bousfield (2008: 193–194) 
argues that interactions with offensive countering use the classic impoliteness strategies, 
discussed also in this thesis, as tools. They require the interlocutors to be in a similar social 
and/or power positions, which, according to Bousfield, does not happen very often, or at least 
it did not in his data. For my study, this pairing is actually rather interesting, as the debaters 
are largely equal in social status and power.  
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To summarise: 
 
 
 
 
Culpeper et al. (2003: 1568–1577) also wish to highlight the importance of prosody, in other 
words the “pitch (intonation), loudness, speed and voice quality” of speech. The transcriptions 
of discussions only show the words that the participants used in the conversation, and that 
leaves out the tone and intonation, gestures, glances and facial expressions; the importance of 
not only what was said but how it was said. The researchers illustrate this by explaining that 
the examples they have used in the paper are all very clearly impolite to them, but in 
conferences people who have not heard the examples usually found them less obviously so. 
Culpeper (2010: 157) also points out that “prosody and other intensifying techniques are used 
to ensure that we are guided to the ‘impolite’ interpretation”, if there is room for 
understanding the interlocution in another way. One impoliteness strategy which I expect to 
be frequent in my data can be emphasised prosodically. This is the negative impoliteness 
strategy of hinder linguistically (interruptions and denying turn). 
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Bousfield (2008: 206) states that discourse endings have been somewhat neglected in the 
impoliteness studies. However, the resolutions of disagreements are central in the actual 
conversations. Drawing from Vuchinich’s (1990, quoted here from Bousfield 2008) work, 
Bousfield introduces five types of conflict termination: 
1) Submission to opponent. “The first participant “gives in” and accepts the opponent’s 
position.” Bousfield marks this as the prominent resolution especially in his military 
training data.  
2) Dominant 3rd party intervention, where “an ongoing-conflict [sic] between 
participants is “broken-up” [sic] by a third party”. Usually the third party has some 
power over the interlocutors, even if they are not traditional authority figures. In my 
data the moderator of the debates might be found to be this powerful third party. 
3) Compromise. Sometimes “the participants negotiate (a) concession(s) – a position 
between the opposing positions that define the dispute.  
4) Stand-off. This is a situation where “the conflict continues with neither party 
submitting.” Theoretically this could be infinite, but the situation usually resolves 
when the topic is changed.  
5) Withdrawal. This requires one opponent withdrawing from the discussion, and 
possibly even physically leaving the area.  
(Bousfield 2008: 206–215) 
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2.4.2. The use of impoliteness strategies 
 
Bousfield (2008) expands on the analysis of impoliteness strategies Culpeper et al. (2003) 
brushed upon in their article. He looks extensively into Culpeper’s (1996) positive and 
negative impoliteness output strategies, seeking to further define and illustrate them via his 
own data (which appears to be, at least partially, the same data as in Culpeper et al. 2003). His 
most interesting idea, however, is that “participants tend to combine, or ‘mix’ together, 
impolite strategies within a single utterance” (Bousfield 2008: 146). In fact, Bousfield points 
out that in his data “participants rarely used a single strategy in isolation” (ibid). In addition, 
Bousfield (2008: 146–167) suggests that impoliteness can in fact span throughout an entire 
conversation. He makes a distinction between “simple” and “complex” impoliteness, ‘simple’ 
meaning single strategy impoliteness and ‘complex’ meaning “complex, (co-)realisation of 
impoliteness strategies, within a single utterance, or turn-at-talk” (p. 155). In the cases of 
complex impoliteness, one particular strategy may be used repeatedly to form a parallelism, 
or several strategies may be repeated over a conversation, or several strategies can be 
combined and used within one interlocution. Bousfield (2008: 161) also points out that when 
there are several impoliteness strategies in use within a conversation, they can also orient 
towards several aspects of face.   
 
Bousfield (2008: 169–170) is interested in impoliteness patterns and structures within a 
conversation. He believes that context and the interlocutors’ reactions to impoliteness are a 
central part of the analysis. Since Bousfield also argues that combinations and repetitions of 
impoliteness strategies within a conversation are more common than individual, isolated 
instances of impoliteness (see paragraph above), patterns and context really do make a 
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difference. Bousfield (2008: 171–173) utilises Levinson’s (1979) and Thomas’ (1995, quoted 
here from Bousfield 2008) work on activity types, when attempting to define the importance 
of context further. Thomas gives activity types six attributes, and Bousfield looks at them 
from the viewpoint of impoliteness research:  
- The Goals of the Participants. “The goals of the individuals rather than the event” 
(Bousfield 2008: 172). At times these two can vastly differ, and if one interlocutor is 
acting based on the goals of the situation and the other is looking at the situation from 
his or her individual point of view, conflict can arise.  
- Allowable Contributions. “Some interactions are characterised by social or legal 
constraints on what participants may say” (Bousfield 2008: 172, quoting Thomas 
1995: 190). This means that the register and choice of words are important, and when 
looking at impoliteness, that might be restrained due to this. The allowable 
contributions are quite central for my study, as the political debate context dictates 
how a disagreement can be voiced. 
- The degree to which Gricean maxims are adhered to or are suspended. Bousfield 
(2008: 172) points out that in some of the contexts from their data, such as the 
examples from the army, the Gricean maxims are frequently violated but that in 
everyday conversations adhering to the maxims is more of a norm. 
- The degree to which the interpersonal maxims are adhered to or are suspended. 
Bousfield states that “while some activity types would presume the interpersonal 
maxims will be broken, for effect, some which can result in impoliteness, do not 
presume this (rather they anticipate it may be a possibility)” (2008: 173, original 
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emphasis). Interpersonal maxims here refer to Leech’s (1983) work, especially the 
politeness principle. 
- Turn taking and topic control. On the whole, this is an important area for 
impoliteness. It is also strongly linked to the allowable contributions attribute, as the 
interactants’ “social and discoursal roles in the situation at hand significantly affect the 
way in which turn taking and topic control can be exploited” (Bousfield 2008: 173). I 
shall elaborate on this shortly. 
- The manipulation of pragmatic parameters. Pragmatic parameters are, for example, 
“the social distance; their [the interlocutors’] powers, rights, obligations, the size of 
the face threat, how the face threat is delivered or managed,” and so on (ibid). The 
interlocutors’ roles within the conversation dictate how much room there is to 
manipulate the parameters.  
 
Other important factors that influence the context are the interlocutors’ background 
knowledge which helps them to interpret the messages from the speaker, and the dynamic 
potential of the context, meaning paying attention to if and how the context changes during 
the conversation (Bousfield 2008: 180–181). 
 
2.4.3. Turn-taking (who has the floor?) 
 
A normal conversation entails certain, rules of conduct, such as people speaking one at a time 
and that there are changes in who speaks (Silverman 1998, quoted here from Bousfield 2008: 
225, see also Sacks 1992 and Sacks et al. 1974). Speaking rights, participant powers and 
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interactant’s obligations in the conversation are important. Simultaneous talk is not 
uncommon, but giving room to other people to speak is an expectation of orderly 
communication, where the participants can actually hear what the other person is saying. 
Thus, manipulating turn-taking and controlling the floor can be effective means of conveying 
impoliteness.  
 
Mey (2001, quoted here from Bousfield 2008: 228) defines the “floor” as “the right to speak” 
and “turn” as “the utterance made by the speaker once one person has relinquished the floor 
and the speaker takes it”. Bousfield (2008: 228, paraphrasing Edelsky 1981) argues that a turn 
can be taken without having the floor, and he adds to Edelsky’s view that it is also possible to 
take a turn without taking the floor, by staying silent or choosing not to respond. Additionally, 
especially if the nature of the talk is competitive (such as in the election debates), there may 
be instances where one interlocutor tries to take a turn, but the floor has been denied from him 
or her. Bousfield (2008: 229–230) views this kind of speaking “out of turn” as a vehicle of 
impoliteness. In a situation where the turns and the floor are fought over, equal power 
relations are essential. Speaking out of turn cannot happen when one of the interlocutors is in 
a subordinate position. Some important aspects of the turn-taking process include 
interruptions and challenging of the other interlocutor (Bousfield, 2008: 233–253). 
 
2.5. The political context 
 
Harris (2001) points out that most of the research done on politeness and impoliteness focuses 
on informal contexts. This is true in, for example, the research of Culpeper (for example 
 34 
 
1996, 2003) and Bousfield (2003, 2008), whose data come mostly from reality TV depicting 
the life of army recruits, chefs or traffic wardens. The emphasis is on the “linguistic behaviour 
of speakers as individual agents” (Harris 2001: 452). Im/politeness is much less frequently 
studied in more formal contexts which are outside ordinary conversations. As one explanation 
for this, Harris introduces the view of Lakoff (1989, quoted here from Harris 2001), who sees 
politeness as something that is first and foremost relevant in defining relationships. 
Exchanging information is secondary, if necessary at all.  
 
Harris (2001:  453–455) proposes that an institutionalised setting such as a classroom, a court 
or a venue of debate forms a specific community of practice, which gives the use of language 
in each of these settings a context. Every community of practice has its own set of rules, 
which determine what kind of behaviour is acceptable within that community. Thus, each 
community of practice also defines what is considered polite or impolite within that context, 
even if that definition conflicts with the norms of informal conversations: 
“Judging what is polite against a set of expectations within a specific community of practice thus 
has distinct advantages, as has been claimed, though these expectations cannot be divorced from 
the wider social and political world of which they are a part and which informs them. “ 
Harris (2001: 454) 
 
Similarly, Locher and Watts (2005, paraphrased in Locher and Watts 2008: 78) state that  
“[w]hether interactants perceive or intend a message to be polite, impolite or merely appropriate 
(among many other labels) depends on judgements that they make at the level of relational work 
in situ, i.e. during and ongoing interaction in a particular setting. These judgements are made on 
the basis of norms and expectations that individuals have constructed and acquired through 
categorising the experiences of similar past situations, or conclusions that one draws from other 
people’s experiences.” 
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For example, Harris’ (2001) data comes from the Prime Minister’s Question Time, which has 
very specific rules of conduct that differ from everyday conversation but also from ordinary 
debates. There are rules governing, for instance, how the MPs address each other, how 
arguments are presented and how turn taking works within the debate (for more detailed 
description, see, for instance, Chilton 2004). These regulations have a long history and have 
been formed over time (Harris 2001: 454–455). Bousfield (2008: 174) discusses similar 
concepts (though not specifically relatied to political speech) when he speaks of social roles, 
which “imply power, rights and obligations of the participants” and discourse roles that define 
the “relationship between the participants and the message”. In addition, Archer (2010), who 
has studied lawyers’ speech in cross-examinations, argues that in that particular context 
impolite speech falls somewhere between Goffman’s (1967) intentional and incidental levels, 
as a strategically ambivalent face threat. 
 
In comparison to this, the Leaders’ Debates I have used as my data show both similarities and 
differences. There are quite a few rules concerning the general organisation of the debates 
(Mair 2010), but the general nature of the debates is not as formal as in Question Time.  
 
Harris (2001: 456-469) argues that there are three ways the speech of the Prime Minister’s 
Question Time is significant for the politeness theory. Firstly, 
 “(t)hat much of the discourse of Prime Minister’s Question Time is composed of intentional and 
explicitly face-threatening (or face-enhancing) acts and that these can be analysed in terms of 
both propositional (e.g. hostile/supportive propositions/presuppositions which preface or are 
built into questions and responses to questions) and the interactional (e.g. modes of address, 
turn-taking ‘rules’, non-verbal and paralinguistic behaviour) levels.  
Harris (2001: 456) 
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 For my research, this is a very interesting context. The debaters can and are expected to be 
face-threatening, but there are still certain norms they have to adhere to. To utilise Culpeper et 
al.’s example above, the expression “You have shit for brains!” would not be appropriate 
during Question Time, no matter how much in the wrong the debater on the opposite side is 
perceived to be. The interlocutors need to be able to find other ways to deliver the message in 
a more fitting register, which may still be openly hostile and impolite. 
  
According to Harris (2001: 458-459), strategies that MPs use for impoliteness centre on 
questioning the authority of the opponent, often by using implicatures or presuppositions. For 
example, in “[w]ill the Prime Minister promise straightforwardness and honesty in future 
health announcements” (example (j), p. 459), the MP implies that past announcements are 
have not been straightforward and honest. Additionally, lexical choices can prove to be very 
significant. Since the MPs are not allowed to directly accuse each other of lying, the speakers 
will have to find other ways of expressing their suspicion, such as: “No one any longer 
believes the Prime Minister’s fiction about the Government’s figures, let alone the fiction 
about the Opposition’s figures…” (Example (k), p. 459, added emphasis).  
 
Secondly,  
“(t)hat negative politeness features co-exist, often in the immediate discourse context and 
sometimes in the same utterance, with the performance of intentional threats to the hearer’s 
positive face and that these can only be understood and interpreted in relationship to the 
institution of Parliament and the wider political context, including the televising of 
Parliamentary debates.” 
 Harris (2001: 462-463) 
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Harris (2001: 463) makes a very important point regarding impoliteness in a more 
institutionalised context. Just because the language needs to be formal in a formal setting, it 
does not mean the interlocutors cannot or will not be intentionally impolite. The formality of 
the situation forces upon certain strategies that aim to avoid impoliteness, but they seem to co-
exist with the acts that are clearly intended as impolite. For example:   
 S:  Mr William Hague 
L of O: Madam Speaker – we have got used to the Prime Minister dodging 
questions at these sessions – but we have not been used to it’s 
becoming more pathetic as the questions go on – the fact is that he 
went to Amsterdam – signed away this country’s legal rights by 
accident and came back with a letter saying “Don’t worry about it” 
– that is not very good for a lawyer – is it – after all this – is it not 
obvious that assurances that he offered to businesses about 
European regulation before the election are like the assurances he 
gave to students and to people with pension funds – absolutely 
worthless.  
Harris (2001: 463) 
 
The Leader of Opposition follows here the restrictions issued by the general rules for the 
Question Time debate:  
Members of the House are not referred to by name except when they are called upon by the 
Speaker to ask a question, and MPs normally preface their questions (and the Prime Minister his 
responses) with a n explicit address token to the Speaker of the House. […] This practice again 
would usually be regarded as marking a high degree of deference and depersonalization, 
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associated primarily with formal contexts and identified as a feature of negative politeness 
which usually both distances interactants and denotes mutual respect 
Harris (2001: 464) 
 
Harris (2001: 464) states that this formality aims to ensure a certain formality in the debates. 
The enforced negative politeness behaviour thus eliminates the possibility of use of some 
impoliteness strategies. Still, simultaneously with the obligatory negative politeness the MPs 
manage to intentionally threaten the positive face. For example, in the exchange above, Harris 
argues that the Leader of the Opposition creates these damaging propositions: 
- that the Prime minister refuses to answer questions (accusation) 
- that his failure to answer questions is ever more evident (contempt) 
- that he has signed away the country’s legal rights (criticism) 
- that he is not a good lawyer (ridicule) 
- that his assurances are not valid ones (challenge) 
 
In addition, Harris highlights some of the lexical choices of the Leader of Opposition.  By 
using words and terms such as ‘dodging questions’, ‘pathetic’, and ‘absolutely worthless’ the 
speaker can intensify the offending message without breaking the rules of the debate.  
Finally,  
[t]hat systematic impoliteness is not only sanctioned in Prime Minister’s Question Time but it is 
also rewarded in accordance with the expectations of Members of the (and the overhearing 
audience) by and adversarial and confrontational political progress. Hence, even the most serious 
face-threatening acts rarely, if ever, occasion a break-down in interpersonal relationships nor 
are they intended to.  
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Harris (2001: 466, added emphasis) 
 
Here we can see an essential difference in impoliteness between informal and formal contexts. 
Harris explains (2001: 467) that in the political debate impoliteness is more ritualistic, and 
thus less offensive. In question time, there seems to be a certain theatricality to them, which 
steps into the field of ritual insults, a sign of solidarity. The argument focuses on the issues, 
not the people.  
 
Still, an interesting question is how much of this is accurate, specifically for Question Time. 
Harris (2001: 467) points out that in this particular context humour and wit are more effective 
ways for the challenger to question the Prime Minister than aggressive rudeness. But is this 
the case in all formal contexts? And how offensive can one be in a debate before the matter 
becomes personal? 
 
Locher and Watts (2008: 85) discuss impoliteness in another formal context, a political 
interview. They argue that impoliteness in such a context is “intimately tied to issues of power 
and the exercise of power in the interview situation.” This is an important aspect of a debate, 
and surely prevalent in my data as well, but as it would open the research to another rather 
extensive direction, I will not discuss the question of power relations in my study.  
 
Garcia-Pastor (2008) is one of the few researchers to have studied impoliteness from this 
specific context. She introduces several studies that do have politeness aspect as a part of their 
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study, but argues that “politeness studies of political discourse in general, and electoral 
debates in particular, are still scarce.” She, too, explains that the link between the use of 
power and im/politeness research is central. In her study, Garcia-Pastor focuses on “those 
interventions in which politicians principally address one another, since they best exemplify 
the combative dimension of these encounters.” This seems like a sound strategy for my thesis 
study as well.  
 
Garcia-Pastor (2008) studied “sixteen debates of the 2000 U.S. elections corresponding to a 
total of twenty hours of ongoing talk”, and placed the impolite instances within the face 
aggravating impoliteness strategies. She comes to the conclusion that  
[p]oliticians discredit the opponent, and coerce him/her into a specific course of action in their 
interchanges. This gives place to a discursive struggle which 1) evinces the interrelation between 
impoliteness and power in debates, and 2) underscores the relational, dynamic and contestable 
features of these concepts. Such struggle illustrates the attack-defence or defence-attack 
dynamics characteristic of these contexts, too. 
Garcia-Pastor (2008: 121) 
 
It will be interesting to see how central the relationship between power and impoliteness will 
be in my study. Since power relations are such an extensive concept, I have chosen not to 
include them in any great detail in this thesis, but should I ever continue with this research 
beyond this study, this is something that most likely should be looked into. 
This has been an overview of impoliteness studies on a rather general level. In the following 
chapters I will first look at the data I am going to apply these theories to, and then see how my 
findings from the data will fit into the framework of impoliteness strategies.  
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3. Methodology 
 
In the previous chapter I presented the aspects of impoliteness theory relevant to this study. 
The focus was on the work of Culpeper (1996, 2003 as Culpeper et al., 2010), and Bousfield 
(2008), and I also briefly looked into the field of political speech from the viewpoint of 
impoliteness. This chapter includes an introduction of the aims and methods of the study and 
presents the data. 
 
The aim of this study is to find out what kinds of impoliteness strategies are prevalent in the 
formal context of a political debate. I hypothesise that certain strategies, such as ‘use taboo 
words’ or ‘call the other one names’, are unlikely to emerge, whereas strategies such as 
‘condescend, scorn or ridicule’ and ‘hinder / block’ will be used more frequently. I aim to find 
out which strategies are recurring, and if the three debaters use similar or different strategies 
when attempting to persuade the audience to vote for them in the upcoming elections. I will 
also attempt to determine what kind of impoliteness is possible in a formal context.  
 
Culpeper defined the first set of impoliteness strategies in 1996. He defines five super-
strategies, and additional output strategies to two of the super-strategies.  
The super-strategies and output strategies are (they were introduced in greater detail in Ch 2): 
1. Bald on record impoliteness 
2. Positive impoliteness 
 This entails the following output strategies: 
- Ignore, snub the other 
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- Exclude the other from an activity 
- Disassociate from the other 
- Be disinterested, unconcerned, unsympathetic 
- Use inappropriate identity markers 
- Use obscure or secretive language 
- Seek disagreement: select a sensitive topic.  
- Make the other feel uncomfortable  
- Use taboo words  
- Call the other names 
3. Negative impoliteness 
 This entails the following output strategies: 
- Frighten 
- Condescend, scorn or ridicule 
- Invade the other’s space, literally or metaphorically 
- Explicitly associate with a negative aspect and personalise  
- Put the other’s indebtedness on record 
 
4. Sarcasm or mock impoliteness 
5. Withhold politeness. 
 
 
Bousfield (2008) has extended the output strategies to entail the following: 
- Avoid agreement (as an addendum to seek disagreement) 
- Threaten (to be combined with and support the strategy frighten) 
- Criticise  
- Hinder/block, physically or communicatively 
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- Enforce role shift  
- Challenge 
 
In my study, I expect to find mostly instances of the super-strategies of positive and negative 
impoliteness and, more specifically, of their output strategies. They are the most detailed and 
the most relevant to communication in a formal setting. I do not expect to find instances of the 
other three super-strategies, though I will mention any occurrences should they arise from the 
data. 
 
My primary data is the transcripts of all three TV debates, provided by the BBC News (see 
bibliography for the link). Videos of the debates can also be found in the C-SPAN video 
archive (see bibliography for the links). The ability to follow the debates both from the 
transcripts and the videos will be useful when looking into interruptions and to the tones of 
voices when searching for instances of sarcasm. Since I will be using ready-made 
transcriptions of the debate as my preliminary data, having access to the videos also enables 
me to ensure that there are not significant parts missing or poorly transcribed. I will have to 
slightly modify the transcriptions to include all the interruptions, as the transcriptions were 
not originally intended as a source for a linguistic study. 
 
The debates took place on three consecutive Thursdays; April 15, April 22 and April 29 in 
2010. Each debate was 90 minutes long. The participants in each debate were Labour leader 
and Prime Minister at the time Gordon Brown (henceforth GB), Conservative leader David 
Cameron (henceforth DC) and Liberal Democrat leader Nick Clegg (henceforth NC). The first 
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debate was produced by ITV and it was hosted by Alistair Stewart, the second one was 
produced by Sky and hosted by Adam Boulton, and the third one was produced by the BBC 
and hosted by David Dimbelby. In each debate, the first half was themed (domestic affairs for 
the first debate, foreign affairs for the second, and economy for the third), and the second half 
consisted of general debate with questions from the audience. 
 
In my research I will proceed to examine the data from the viewpoint of each of the output 
strategies individually, and mark all instances of said strategy. After looking for all the 
strategies in the data, I will compare the frequencies of the different strategies in order to find 
those with the highest frequency of occurrence. After isolating the instances of impoliteness, I 
will divide them by debater, to see if the three debaters favour similar or different 
impoliteness strategies. I am hoping to find statistically significant differences between the 
three debaters’ impoliteness strategy usages. These elements will hopefully illustrate how 
impoliteness occurs in a formal, restricted context. I will introduce and discuss my results in 
the next chapter.  
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4. Results and discussion 
 
In this section I will present and discuss my results. I will first look at the different strategies 
in general, talk about if and how the debaters differ in using them, and give some examples of 
the usage of the strategies in the data. Then, I will focus on each of the debaters separately, 
and discuss their individual debate styles. Finally, I will discuss other aspects of impoliteness, 
presented in Chapter 2, to explain if and how they were prevalent in the data.  
 
4.1. The use of impoliteness strategies in the data 
 
In my methodology section I stated that I will look for the occurrences of impoliteness 
strategies in the three leaders’ debates held before the general election in the UK in 2010.  I 
started by marking all the instances of impoliteness found in the data, and then compared 
them to the impoliteness strategies defined in Culpeper’s (1996, 2003) and Bousfield’s (2008) 
studies.  
The categories I looked for are:  
1. Ignore / snub the other 
2. Exclude the other from an activity 
3. Disassociate from the other 
4. Be disinterested, unconcerned, unsympathetic 
5. Use inappropriate identity markers 
6. Use obscure or secretive language 
7. Seek disagreement or avoid agreement 
8. Make the other feel uncomfortable 
9. Use taboo words 
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10. Call the other names  
11. Frighten, threaten 
12. Condescend, scorn, ridicule 
13. Invade the other’s space 
14. Explicitly associate with a negative aspect and personalise 
15. Put the other’s indebtedness on record 
16. Criticise 
17. Hinder / block 
18. Enforce role shift 
19. Challenge 
20. Use sarcasm 
 
Out of these twenty options, I found instances of 7 categories:  
 1. Disassociate from the other 
 2. Seek disagreement or avoid agreement 
 3. Condescend, scorn, ridicule, use sarcasm
1
 
 4. Explicitly associate with a negative aspect and personalise 
 5. Criticise 
 6. Hinder / block 
 7. Challenge 
In addition, there were a couple of instances that did not fit into any of the categories, and 
were thus labelled  
 8. Miscellaneous 
 
                                                 
1
 The use of sarcasm is a separate category in Culpeper’s and Bousfield’s works, but in my data only three 
instances of it emerged, and since they all also could be interpreted as a part of the ‘condescend, scorn, ridicule’ -
category, I have included sarcasm as a part of this group. Sarcasm may be more clearly a separate category in a 
different context, but here the coupling was natural. I will discuss and exemplify this further as I discuss this 
category.  
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Of the 20 possible categories, some were automatically ruled out due to the more formal 
context of the debate, in comparison to, for example, the data that Bousfield (2008) uses, 
which is collected from reality television. Because the register of language in political speech 
tends to be formal, strategies such as ‘use taboo words’ and ‘frighten / threaten’ are highly 
unlikely to emerge. Similarly, as the debaters are there to challenge each other, categories 
such as ‘exclude the other from an activity’ or ‘use obscure or secretive language’ were also 
improbable. However, categories such as ‘ignore or snub the other’ and ‘put the other’s 
indebtedness on record’, or even ‘use inappropriate identity markers’, if the debate is heated 
enough, are plausible options, just not manifested in this data.  
 
The 8 strategies that were exhibited in the data were distributed as follows:  
 
Figure 1 The distribution of the total use of impoliteness strategies normalised per 1000 words. For the 
detailed figures, see Appendix 1. 
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We can see here that most of the strategies, save the second one, ‘seek disagreement or avoid 
agreement’, and, as already mentioned, there were only a few instances of impoliteness that 
fell into the ‘miscellaneous’ -category, were quite equally frequently used. The strategy 
‘hinder / block’ was clearly the most frequently used one with 33% of the instances. 
‘Challenge’ and ‘criticise’ were almost equally frequently used, 17% and 16% of the time, 
respectively, and ‘associate with a negative aspect, personalise’, ‘disassociate from the other’ 
and ‘condescend, scorn, ridicule, use sarcasm’ are at a quite similar frequencies, at 12%, 11% 
and 8% percent, respectively.  
 
However, when each debater’s strategy usage is studied individually, it becomes apparent that 
the three leaders use impoliteness strategies differently:  
 
Figure 2 Number of occurrences per feature per speaker, normalised per 1000 words. For the detailed 
figures, see Appendix 1 
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The differences in the usage of strategies between the debaters are statistically very highly 
significant (x2= 79.16, df=14, p<0.001)
2
. I will discuss each variable individually below.  
 
4.1.1. Disassociate from the other 
 
Culpeper’s (1996: 357) examples of this category are both verbal; denying association or 
common ground with the other, and physical; such as avoiding sitting together. Naturally, in 
this data’s context, the focus is on the verbal aspect. Here are some examples of the 
manifestation of the variable: 
 
[1] GB:  Nobody earning below £20,000 will pay the national insurance rise. The reason for the national 
insurance rise is to ensure our health services, our police and our education, and David can't 
guarantee funding for police and education that will match what we are doing. That's the reason 
for the national insurance rise. But nobody below £20,000 will pay it. Six million people in this 
country receive tax credits, and the Conservatives and Liberals have a plan to reduce tax 
credits for middle-class families. I come back to this central question about fairness in the tax 
system. If David wants fairness in the tax system, why does he support this inheritance tax cut 
for only 3,000 families, worth £200,000 each? The biggest beneficiary of the Conservative 
manifesto is, as always, the richest estates in the country, and not the ordinary, hard-working 
people of this country. If the Liberals want to cut child tax credits with the Conservatives, then I 
can say one thing - I will never form an alliance with a Conservative government that cuts child 
tax credits. 
(Debate 3, p. 6) 
 
[2] DC:  Just one point on the European issue. There is a bit of a con going on here as well. The Lisbon 
Treaty has just about seven words on climate change. You don't need another treaty for 
politicians to get together in different countries, you need political will, you need action. That is 
what is required. Instead, what we keep getting from the other two parties is more 
institutions, more regulation, more new agreements. That's not what's required. It's action at 
the European level and that requires political will. 
 (Debate 2, p. 11) 
                                                 
2
 Unless otherwise stated, all statistical analysis refers to Chi2 Analysis, all but the first one are calculated with 
Yates’ Correction for one-way design, where p<0.05 is significant, p<0.01 is very significant, and p<0.001 is 
very highly significant. 
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[3] NC: Maybe I should explain, rather than having David Cameron and Gordon Brown, very much 
in the style of old politics, making misleading claims. I think there is a problem. It's a 
problem I didn't create, you didn't create, they created. It was Conservative and Labour 
Governments that created chaos in your immigration system so that lots of people came 
here illegally. Now, they're here, OK, it's a problem. They're here, whether we like it or not. So 
I think we have to deal with it. I'm saying that for those who've been here for a decade, who 
speak English, who want to play by the rules, who want to pay taxes, who want to come out of 
the shadows, do community service to make up for what they've wrong, it's better to get them 
out of the hands of the criminals, so we can go after the criminals, and in the hands of the 
taxman. You can pretend as much as you like, David Cameron and Gordon Brown, that 
somehow you can deport people when you don't even know where they are. I'm coming up with 
a proposal. It might be controversial, but it's dealing with the way the world is. Get real. This is a 
problem you created. We now need to sort it on a one-off basis. It's a one-off problem which 
needs a solution. 
 (Debate 3, p. 15) 
 
Considering that these debates had the aim of winning over undecided voters, it is not 
surprising that the strategy to differentiate from the other two parties is prevalent. However, 
the statistical analysis shows that there are highly significant differences between the usage of 
this strategy between the debaters (x2= 27.71, df=2, p<0.01). Out of the three debaters, NC 
uses the strategy most frequently, he uses this variable very highly significantly more than GB 
(x2= 23.17, df=1, p<0.001) and highly significantly more than DC (x2= 10.29, df=1, p<0.01). 
The difference in usage between GB and DC is not statistically significant (x2= 3.52, df=1, 
p>0.05). 
 
Thus, we can draw the conclusion that NC uses this strategy the most. One reason for this is 
probably the political party he represents. The Liberal Democrats are the third largest party in 
Britain, and while they have quite a lot of power, it is still clear that they are somewhat the 
weaker party. NC’s strategy throughout the debates is to not only differentiate from “the old 
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parties”, as he said in example [3], but also to make it clear that they have a new, different 
approach and ideas.   
 
While NC focuses on trying to convince the audience that his party is different from “the old 
parties”, DC and GB also spend time making sure to highlight that they are different from the 
biggest competitor. At times the Liberal Democrats are not mentioned at all, but all the focus 
is on how poorly the Labour or the Conservatives have managed the country. For example:   
 
[4] GB: Creativity, discipline, standards in schools, but we can't evade this question: if we're going to 
have the best education for our children, we do need the teachers and the teaching assistants. If 
you cut money out of the education budget now, you'll be cutting the numbers of teachers and 
teaching assistants. We say it's so important for our country that while we cut the deficit, we 
will maintain our investment in education per pupil. Now, the Conservatives cannot say 
this, and I think we need an answer this evening. Again, it's the risk, the risk to our health 
service, the risk in crime if you have less police. Now it's the risk to education. 
 (Debate 1, p. 17) 
 
‘Disassociate from the other’ proved to be an important impoliteness strategy in this context. 
It is a very clear way of conveying the differences between the debater’s party and the 
competition, which is naturally very important in a political debate. 
 
4.1.2. Seek disagreement or avoid agreement 
 
In Culpeper’s (1996: 357) view this strategy takes place when an interlocutor chooses a 
sensitive topic. His definition of the strategy is solely ‘seek disagreement’. Bousfield (2008: 
108–109) defines the strategy further, adding the ‘avoid agreement’. In a way, the entire 
context of the electoral debates can be seen as an attempt to seek disagreement and avoid 
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agreement. The whole purpose of the debates is to help the undecided to choose for whom to 
vote. This attitude can even be seen in the debates; on a couple of occasions the moderator 
moves on to a more controversial topic if the debaters seem to agree too much. For instance:  
[5] Adam Boulton: OK, thank you. Given the degree of agreement, we're going to move on now 
and take some more questions. That brings to an end the international affairs 
part of this debate, although we may well come back to it in subsequent 
questions, and in a moment we're going to move on to the open section. […] 
 (Debate 2, p. 13) 
 
While the entire debates fit into this category, actual instances of ‘seek disagreement / avoid 
agreement’ were quite few, only 0.22 instances per 1000 words. There was not enough data to 
evaluate the statistical significance of differences between the debaters with this variable. 
However, it is interesting to look into the couple of instances where this strategy does occur. 
For example: 
 
[6] DC:  The point is that today, actually, the number of nurses is going up - the number of managers is 
going up five times faster than the number of nurses in our NHS. The government has had 13 
years to fix these problems, and it hasn't done. Gordon Brown talks about cancer, but what 
he's not telling you is that there are people in our country, there was a case the other day of 
someone who had to sell their home to get the cancer drugs. And the Prime Minister, the 
government, is about to hit the NHS, Britain's biggest employer, with this National Insurance 
rise. It's going to take £200 million out of our National Health Service. We say stop that 
National Insurance rise, and instead spend the money on a cancer drugs fund, so people can get 
the drugs they need. Talk about guarantees, but the fact is for some people, waiting two weeks to 
see a consultant is too long. We need a faster, choice-driven system, but the drugs have got to be 
there when you need them. They're not always right now. 
 (Debate 1, p. 27) 
This is a very typical example of how this strategy occurs in this data. The debater is not 
willing to accept what the other person has previously said about the topic and move on to the 
next one, but he is aiming at prolonging the discussion of that particular topic and pointing 
out elements of it that are not flattering to the opponent. The strategy appeared in contexts 
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where the debater was responding to something his opponent had already said, and thus it 
could be seen to follow Bousfield’s addition, ‘avoid agreement’.  
 
4.1.3. Condescend, scorn, ridicule, and use sarcasm.  
 
Culpeper (1996: 385) and Culpeper et al. (2003) remark that the use of this impoliteness 
strategy being contemptuous and emphasising one’s relative power. Bousfield (2008: 114) 
also remarks that the use of this strategy “can be powerfully impolite”. It is true that in this 
data, too, some of the remarks from this category would be easily categorised as impoliteness, 
also from the viewpoint of 1
st
 degree impoliteness. The general atmosphere of the debates, 
however, despite being competitive, is relatively relaxed, and since the competition and 
criticism is aimed at ideas more than people, even the more personal attacks lose their hardest 
edge. Some examples include:  
 
[7] GB: That's why there are 20,000 more people in prison as a result of the tougher sentences we've 
been passing. But you've got to answer this question: we will continue to match the funding of 
the police as of now. You are saying you're going to cut it. Now, be honest with the public, 
because you can't airbrush your policies, even though you can airbrush your posters. 
 (Debate 1, p. 10) 
 
[8] DC:  Labour seem to confuse the economy with the government. What we're saying is, save 
government waste to put money back in people's pockets. That's what - if you think about this, 
saving one out of every £100, that is something every small business, every large business, many 
families have had to do in this country, and government should do the same. Gordon's 
argument, in a way, is "Let me go on wasting your money, so I can put up your taxes next 
year", and it's taxes on people earning £20,000, £21,000. These are not rich people. They 
shouldn't be paying for the mistakes of the bankers and for the dreadful record of Gordon's 
government. 
 (Debate 3, p. 5) 
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[9] NC: I have to say, David Cameron has the most creative justification I've ever heard for giving 
tax breaks to double millionaires. But, anyway, there you go. Look, I think Adina's point is 
that taxes are unfair on millions of people on ordinary incomes, not the double millionaires that 
David Cameron wants to help. Millions of ordinary people are simply struggling to pay the fuel 
bills, to pay the petrol prices, to pay the weekly shopping bills. What I'm... I'm totally with you 
on this, Adina. I think it's just wrong, let's say you are a teaching assistant on £10,000 a year. At 
the moment, you will pay, maybe you work three days a week. You will pay about £1,000 of 
that in tax and national insurance. Under our plan, by lifting the income tax threshold to 
£10,000, you won't pay any income tax on that first £10,000. I believe that if people work hard, 
particularly if they want to get off benefits and start working, even if it's just part-time, we 
should help them keep more of their money. It is as simple as that. That is the fair thing to do. 
 (Debate 3, p. 6) 
 
The difference in usage between the three debaters was not statistically significant for this 
variable (x2=5.21, df=2, p>0.05). In person-to-person comparisons, NC used this variable 
significantly more than GB (x2=4,8, df=1, p<0.05). There was not a statistically significant 
difference between GB and DC (x2=0.73, df=1, p>0.05) or DC and NC (x2=1.88, df=1, 
p>0.05). The differences between the frequencies of usage of this variable may be explained 
by individual debating and expressive styles.  
 
As I already mentioned, I combined the strategy ‘use sarcasm’ to the same group with 
‘condescend, scorn, ridicule’. This was for two reasons. Firstly, there were only three 
instances that would have been clearly categorised as sarcasm in the data, which is not 
sufficient basis for any kind of conclusions. Secondly, many of the instances in ‘condescend, 
scorn, ridicule’ are expressed in a sarcastic manner, thus the groups meld in together rather 
smoothly. For example:  
[10] GB: At Reading Prison, we've been working at this young offenders' institution with companies, and 
where people are in this institution, they've been trained for jobs that they can get if they don't 
reoffend and they go out and actually do a decent job. Now, there's been a 75% success in this 
project, so you can bring the reoffending rate down. But I do come back to this central problem 
that we face - I'm grateful, by the way, David, for you putting up these posters about me 
and about crime and about everything else. You know, there's no newspaper editor done 
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as much for me in the last two years, because my face is smiling on these posters, and I'm 
very grateful to you and Lord Ashcroft for funding that. 
 (Debate 1, p. 9) 
 
4.1.4. Explicitly associate with a negative aspect and personalise 
 
Culpeper (1996: 358) elaborates this category by ‘use the pronouns ‘I’ and ‘you’’. In my data, 
I expanded the notion a little. In this context, the party leader and his party are oftentimes 
treated as one; the debater represents his entire political party. Thus, the personalisation can 
be seen as drawing attention to the negative aspects of both the party leader and the party. For 
instance:  
 
[11] GB: I accept it's been tough in these last two years with the recession, but what we've tried to do, 
when people are in difficulty, is provide tax credits. A half million people have got tax credits 
when they've been on short time and are trying to get through this recession. We've brought 
down the basic rate of tax from 23 pence when we came in to 20 pence. At the same time, we've 
raised the top rate of tax above £150,000 to 50 pence so that that's fair to ordinary, hard-working 
families. I believe in fairness, but one thing I don't believe in is the Conservative policy which 
would cut child tax credits, but at the same time give an inheritance tax cut to the 3,000 richest 
people in the country of £200,000. That's not fairness, that's the same old Conservative 
Party, tax cuts for the very rich, and cutting child tax credits of the very poor. It's simply 
not fair. 
 (Debate 3, p. 5) 
 
[12] DC: People can remember the record of 13 years, they remember who it was who abolished the 10p 
tax that hit some of the poorest people in the country the hardest. They remember the measly 
75p increase on pensioners that Gordon Brown was responsible for. And let me say this, the 
whole reason we're having this debate about how difficult it is to get taxes down, how difficult 
it's going to be to cut spending, is because this Prime Minister and this Government have left 
our economy in such a complete mess with a budget deficit that, this year, is forecast to be 
bigger than that of Greece. That's why we're having to have this debate. Let's not forget whose 
responsibility it is. 
 (Debate 3, p. 8) 
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[13] NC: Firstly, Mary, you need to be given the power to sack any politician who's proved to be corrupt. 
It's something I advocated in the past, it's something I put forward in Westminster, both David 
Cameron and Gordon Brown's party didn't support that. They now say, which is good, say they 
do welcome that. You're the boss, you're the boss. The other thing of course we need to do is 
clean up all the murky business of party funding. We've all had problems with party funding. 
Again, there was a deal, there was a deal on the table, we supported it, to clean up party funding. 
Yet again, the old parties said no. Gordon Brown wanted to protect his trade union pay 
masters, David Cameron wanted to protect his paymaster in Belize. I think we all agree on 
the rhetoric of cleaning up politics, but we actually have to act. I'd say one final thing: one of the 
reasons why your friends and your neighbours are perhaps right in saying they feel ignored is 
because we have this very odd electoral system which allows Gordon Brown the Prime 
Minister to be in power when only 22% of people voted for his party last time, many people 
are being ignored and we need to change that as well.  
 (Debate 2, p. 14) 
 
Just like ‘disassociate with the other’, ‘explicitly associate with a negative aspect and 
personalise’ seem to be an integral part of a political debate. This impoliteness strategy allows 
the debater to draw the voters’ attention to those details that would persuade the audience not 
to vote for the competition. The strategy is also effective. Personalising and claiming that one 
person is solely responsible for the problems in the society may be simplifying, but these 
kinds of claims are easy to remember.   
 
There was a statistically significant (x2=8.86, df=2, p<0.05) difference in usage with this 
variable. There was not a statistically significant difference between GB and DC (x2=0.17, 
df=1, p>0.05), but GB used the variable highly significantly more than NC (x2=8.53, df=1, 
p<0.01), and DC used the variable significantly more than NC (x2=6.43, df=1, p<0.05). 
Perhaps because the Labour and Conservative parties have a long history of competing 
against each other, the mentality is also reflected here and GB and DC used this variable more 
frequently.  
 
 57 
 
4.1.5. Criticise 
 
Bousfield (2008:126) argues that the impoliteness strategy ‘criticise’ takes place when s 
dispraises h, “some action or inaction by h, or some entity in which h has invested face.” In 
this particular context, I would claim that the strategy ‘criticise’ is quite closely related to the 
previous discussed strategy, ‘explicitly associate with a negative aspect and personalise’, but 
the difference is that when the previous strategy focused on people, this one has its focal point 
at actions. Similarly to the previous strategy, this one also allows the debaters to highlight the 
shortcomings of the competition. For example:  
 
[14] GB: Nick, I'm not really interested in point scoring, I'm interested in doing the right thing. If we send 
out a message to people in other parts of the world, you get an amnesty if you come to this 
country, then you've got a real problem. 
 (Debate 2, p. 25) 
 
[15] DC: A lot of people would ask, though, we've had 13 years of a government that's now only 
started to talk about addressing this issue. If you look at the numbers, net migration levels 
before 1997 were never greater than 77,000 a year. Under your government, they've never been 
less than 140,000 a year. That's a very big number. 
 (Debate 1, p. 5) 
 
[16] NC: Was it Adina? Sorry, in this echoey hall, I couldn't hear. Yes, Adina, I think you're absolutely 
right. Our tax system is grotesquely unfair. After 13 years of Labour, who would have 
believed it that you would have now a tax system where a multimillionaire from the City of 
London, pays a lower rate of tax on their capital gains, that's income to you or me, than 
their cleaner does on their wages. After 13 years of Labour, we have the bottom 20% of 
people in this country who pay more in tax as a proportion of their income than the top 
20%. I think we need to change that. David Cameron says you can't afford tax giveaways. No, 
you can't. What you can do is switch the tax system, make it fair. Make sure that those huge 
loopholes that only people right at the top, very wealthy people who can afford a football team 
of lawyers and accountants to get out of paying tax, close those loopholes, give the money back 
to people so that they pay no income tax on the first £10,000 that you earn. That's £700 back in 
the pocket of the vast majority of you in this country. 
 (Debate 3, p. 6) 
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With this variable there were statistically significant differences between the debaters 
(x2=7.79, df=2, p<0.05). DC used this variable highly significantly more than GB (x2=7.74, 
df=1, p<0.01), and significantly more than NC (x2=1.81, df=1, p<0.05). NC used the strategy 
significantly more than GB (x2=2.17, df=1, p<0.05).  
 
The reason that DC and NC use this impoliteness strategy more than GB might come from 
power relations. When the debates took place the Labour Party and Gordon Brown were in 
power. Thus, it is natural for the opposing party leaders to criticise all the things that they feel 
the sitting prime minister is responsible for. Both DC and NC were keen to point out what had 
been gone wrong under the Labour government, and especially DC seemed very eager to 
highlight the problems the Labour Party had not fixed during their 13-year-governance. 
 
4.1.6. Hinder / block 
 
Bousfield (2008: 127) explains that, in an informal context, hindering and blocking can be 
either physical, for example blocking a passage, or communicative, such as interruptions and 
denying turns. In my data, the strategy manifests only in the communicative form. The 
debaters either hold the floor or try to take over the floor. They go both against each other and 
sometimes against the moderator who tries to hand out turns. For instance:  
[17] GB: Back to the question Robert put, that the PCT, the health authority, was finding it very difficult 
because of the situation at the moment. Take thousands of millions out of the economy now, 
take £6 billion out of the economy now, and think of the risk to jobs and businesses. I say to the 
Conservatives, of course we want efficiency savings and of course we want to deal with waste, 
but we cannot afford to see private investment so small and then public investment cut at this 
time and lots of jobs put at risk. 
Alistair Stewart: David Cameron. <overlapping> 
GB: Please tell us you won’t do that <overlapping> 
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DC: £6 billion is one out of every £100 the government spends. What small business in this 
recession, what big business hasn't had to make that sort of decision? Many people are making a 
much bigger decision. Turn it round the other way and think about it like this. Gordon is 
effectively saying, "I want to go on wasting money now so I put up your taxes later." Why 
should we pay our taxes for government waste? <overlapping> 
AS: Gordon Brown! <overlapping> 
GB: We've got a responsibility for the overall growth rate of <overlapping> the economy. We've 
got to get this economy moving forward. You can't do it with private investment alone. The 
government has got to play its role. Now, next year, we'll make these bigger savings and of 
course we're going to pay for health and for education, and for policing by what we do on 
National Insurance. But this year, don't pull the money out of the economy, don't put good 
people's jobs and their businesses at risk now. 
AS: David Cameron! 
DC: But why do you think it is, I would say, that a hundred of the leading business people in this 
country, people who run some of the biggest businesses like Corus, like Logica, like Mothercare, 
why do they say, and they couldn't be more clear, the risk to the economy isn't cutting waste, the 
risk to the economy is Labour's proposal of a jobs tax. <overlapping> 
AS: Gordon Brown on that specific point. <overlapping> 
DC: Why do they say it? <overlapping> 
GB:  The risk to the economy is this year, <overlapping> and every country - America, the rest of 
Europe, including Britain - is saying, we've got to make sure we invest in the economy this year 
so that we can have the growth we need. Now, pull out the money, and you've proposed it at 
every point during this recession, pull out the money and you'll have less growth, you'll have 
less jobs, and you'll have less businesses. That's the fear. We've got to take an overall 
responsibility for the whole economy. 
NC: All I would say is this argument I think just doesn't address the fundamental issue. There are 
going to be big things over the next few years, and neither will come clean on this with you, that 
we simply can't afford to do. Trident, I don't think we can afford it. A tax on banks I think is 
now unavoidable. Tax credits. We need to look at public sector pensions. These are big 
decisions we need to take. <overlapping> 
AS: David Cameron? <overlapping> 
NC: …I would like us for once to get the politicians together… <overlapping> 
AS: Yeah. I’ve got the agenda, Mr. Clegg. Mr Cameron’s response. <overlapping> 
 (Debate 1, p. 21–22) 
 
There seemed to be two reasons for the debaters to use the ‘hinder / block’ -strategy. Either 
they wanted to interject questions and challenges or a correction when another debater was 
talking, or they wanted to hold the floor. The latter type of strategy usage was often conducted 
against the moderator, as in the latter part of the example above.  
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The differences in usage with this variable were statistically very highly significant 
(x2=17.54, df=2, p<0.001). Both GB and NC used this strategy very highly significantly more 
than DC (x2=15.09, df=1, p<0.001 and x2=14.48, df=1, p<0.01, respectively). There was no 
statistically significant difference between GB and NC (x2=0.0069, df=1, p>0.05).  
 
The use of the ‘hinder / block’ impoliteness strategy may be explained as an attempt to gain 
more power in the situation. The debaters are battling against the time restraints enforced by 
the moderator, as they wish to get their viewpoint across as efficiently as possible. Some of 
the usage may also depend on personal debating styles and an inclination to wordiness.  
 
4.1.7. Challenge 
 
Culpeper (2008: 132) defines the impoliteness strategy ‘challenge’ as “ask h a challenging 
question, question h’s position, stance, beliefs, assumed power, rights, obligations, ethics, 
etc.” He also states that challenges are always in the form of a question. I would challenge 
this view a little bit, in my data I found instances that were clearly a challenge, but in a form 
of a statement that is called to be denied or argued. Here are some examples of both kinds of 
challenges:  
[18] GB: David's got it wrong. We're making £15 billion of efficiency savings now. He wants these 
savings on top of that without putting the money back into the economy. You go to America, 
look at France, look at Germany, look at the other countries. They're saying, as all the 
international institutions are saying, don't withdraw the support from the recovery until the 
recovery is assured. What David would do in an emergency budget in a few weeks' time is, for 
ideological reasons, take £6 billion out of the economy and put our recovery at risk. The time to 
do the deficit reduction is when the recovery is assured, and David, you've just got it 
wrong economically. It's the same mistake the Conservatives made, the same old 
Conservative Party of the 1930s, the 1980s, and the 1990s. 
 (Debate 3, p. 4) 
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In this case, to further illustrate the fact that this is not only a criticism but also a challenge, 
DC responds immediately:  
DC: It is every business leader. Every leading business leader is saying that we've got it right, 
and the government going on wasting money is wrong. Let me tell you where I think we 
should start: we should start with welfare. Under this government, there are now five million 
people on out-of-work related benefits. There are people who could work who we'd train and 
offer work. We should say in our country "If you don't accept work, you can't go on claiming 
benefits". That's something Labour have left us with, this terrible mess. And the Liberal 
Democrats have almost nothing to say about welfare, so as we try to get public spending under 
control, let's start with people who can work, who are offered work, but who don't take it. 
 
Other examples of this strategy: 
[19] DC:  Let me take on, Robert, this argument directly, the idea that if you cut waste this year, you 
endanger the recovery. Just this week, we've seen two I think pretty hideous waste stories. The 
first is that civil servants have been given credit cards funded by the tax-payer to go out and 
spend that on food, wine and other things, and that's cost £1 billion. The second story was that 
managers in the National Health Service, many of whom are paid over £250,000, have had a 7% 
pay rise. Are we honestly saying that if you didn't have that sort of waste, that sort of 
excess, that our economy would collapse? I think it's nonsense. It's like saying that giving 
up smoking is somehow going to be bad for your health. Giving up waste would be good for 
our economy, and it would mean that we could stop this tax rise that's coming down the track, 
that Britain's biggest business leaders all say will cost jobs. Cut the waste, stop the tax. That's the 
right answer. 
 (Debate 1, p. 19) 
 
[20] NC: What are you going to do? 
GB: Net inward migration is coming down as a result of the points system that we introduced. It's 
come down three years ago, two years ago, and is coming down this year. We are taking the 
action that is necessary. From the end of this year, people will be counted in and counted out of 
the country... 
NC: Gordon Brown, what are you going to do? 
GB: It would be more helpful if you would support identity cards for foreign nationals instead of 
opposing them. 
NC: I'm just asking for a simple, honest answer to a big question, which is that because of the 
chaos in the system in the past, we have lots of people who are here. Now, if you just ignore 
it, they will carry on living in the shadow of our economy. You can either deny it, which 
you're doing because you have no plan to deal with it, neither do you... 
GB: We're removing them. 
NC: Or you try and... No, you can't deport 900,000 people. You don't know where they live. 
 (Debate 2, p. 25) 
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Example [20] also illustrates that the challenge does not have to limit to one turn of speech, it 
can also spread through a longer conversation. 
 
The differences in usage in this category were statistically highly significant (x2=10.23, df=2, 
p<0.01). GB uses the variably highly significantly more than DC (x2= 9.62, df=1, p<0.01), 
but there are not statistically significant differences between GB and NC (x2=3.46, df=1, 
p>0.05) or between DC and GB (x2=1.65, df=1, p>0.05). Out of the three debaters, GB thus 
used the impoliteness strategy the most frequently. He is also very aggressive in his 
challenges, and often aims them at DC. One reason for this might be the situation GB is in. 
During the debates, he was the sitting prime minister of Britain, but not in a terribly strong 
position as the Conservative Party was quite likely to win the election. Perhaps the best way 
for GB to try to hold on to his position is to challenge his opponents, especially DC, in 
questions that he knows are difficult to respond to. 
 
4.1.8. Miscellaneous  
 
Finally, there were a few instances of impoliteness that did not really fit into any of the 
categories existing for impoliteness strategies. There were not enough of them to provide 
statistical analysis on them, but it might be interesting to take a little look at them nonetheless. 
These undefined strategies were used the most, though not a lot, by DC, 0.53 times per 1000 
words, slightly by NC, 0.12 times per 1000 words, and not at all by GB. It would be 
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interesting to see if, in a larger data set but in a similar context, it would be possible to find 
more instances that are comparable. 
 
Interestingly, all of the instances in this category were quite similar. For example:  
[21] GB: Nobody earning below £20,000 will pay the national insurance rise. The reason for the national 
insurance rise is to ensure our health services, our police and our education, and David can't 
guarantee funding for police and education that will match what we are doing. That's the reason 
for the national insurance rise. But nobody below £20,000 will pay it. Six million people in this 
country receive tax credits, and the Conservatives and Liberals have a plan to reduce tax credits 
for middle-class families. I come back to this central question about fairness in the tax system. If 
David wants fairness in the tax system, why does he support this inheritance tax cut for only 
3,000 families, worth £200,000 each? The biggest beneficiary of the Conservative manifesto is, 
as always, the richest estates in the country, and not the ordinary, hard-working people of this 
country. If the Liberals want to cut child tax credits with the Conservatives, then I can say one 
thing - I will never form an alliance with a Conservative government that cuts child tax credits. 
 
DC: Well, what you're hearing is very desperate stuff from someone who's in a desperate state. 
But you have heard from Labour Gordon Brown that if you earn £20,000 or over, you're 
considered rich, you're considered a target for the Labour government to go on wasting money 
this year and to hit you with taxes next year. Let me answer this question directly about 
inheritance tax. I believe in this country that if you work hard and you save money and you put 
aside money and you try to pay down your mortgage on a family home, you shouldn't have to 
sell that or give it to the tax man when you die. You should be able to pass it on to your children. 
It's the most natural human instinct of all. I'm afraid these other two parties simply don't 
understand that. Inheritance tax should only be paid by the richest, by the millionaire, it 
shouldn't be paid by people who've worked hard and done the right thing in their lives. It's not 
our top priority, our top priority is helping those on the £20,000 that are going to be hit by 
Gordon's other tax. But should we try to encourage people to work hard and save? I say, yes we 
should. 
 (Debate 3, p. 6) 
 
[22] Adam Boulton: Nick Clegg, final word. Anti-American? 
NC: I'd simply say don't let people create scare stories to frighten you into thinking that we 
can't change Europe. Of course we can change Europe. I, unlike David Cameron and Gordon 
Brown, have been in there, have sought changes. We can do it if we leave and don't complain on 
the side-lines. 
 
These instances almost, but not quite, fit into several categories. They could be seen as a part 
of the ‘criticise’ or ‘associate with a negative aspect, personalise’ strategies, but both of those 
focus on the attack, and drawing attention to the political shortcomings of the opponent. The 
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instances in this category serve the purpose of highlighting what the speaker wishes to convey 
as insignificant argument that should not be taken too seriously. They are a response to the 
attempted use of those two strategies.  
 
Another possible category for these instances was ‘avoid agreement or seek disagreement’. 
Again, partially this category is applicable. The debaters will not let the challenge or criticism 
pass, and wish to lessen its impact, often they will even carry the argument further. But 
whereas in example [6] DC attempts to carry on discussing a topic that has already been 
closed and the discussion has moved on, here the emphasis is on undermining the attack from 
the opponent, and furthering the debate on the particular topic is less central a goal.  
 
‘Call the other names’ was another possibility for a fitting category. The debaters insinuate 
that the person they are aiming the impoliteness at is desperate when he says the things he has 
said (example [21]) or a liar (example [22]) who is trying to scare the audience with idle 
threats. However, the debaters do not explicitly call names, they only insinuate. Directly 
calling someone a liar, for example, would be too direct and too confrontational for this 
context, where, despite the heated conversation, the emphasis is ultimately on the ideas rather 
than the people. 
 
Based on the instances found in this data set, the strategy used here could be defined as 
‘belittling’ or ‘undermining’ the opponent. Though Culpeper (1996) mentions ‘belittle the 
other (e.g. use diminutives)’ as a definition for his ‘condescend, scorn, ridicule’ -category, 
that can be interpreted as referring to belittling the person, whereas in the examples found in 
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this data the belittling is aimed at what the opponent is saying, to who he is. The speaker tries 
to convince the audience that the opponent’s previous utterances should not be taken 
seriously. They served as a response to an impoliteness strategy that was directed at the 
speaker by another debater. Unfortunately, there were not enough instances to draw definitive 
conclusion on whether this is a category that should be added to the list of impoliteness 
strategies complied by Culpeper (1996) and extended by Bousfield (2008). 
 
4.2. The debaters’ differences and similarities, and the audience response to the debates. 
 
As we can see in Figure 2 and in the analysis above, the debaters do not use the strategies in 
identical ways.  To compare the general approach of the debaters, I will now look at the three 
top strategies from each debater.  
 
GB’s most used strategies are ‘hinder / block’, followed by ‘challenge’ and ‘associate with a 
negative aspect, personalise’. The most frequently used one speaks about the need to hold the 
floor and to make sure that his views are heard. The two following ones seem to reflect his 
power position in the debate; he’s holding the political power as the prime minister but knows 
that the competition is strong, and he tries his best to make sure that the audience is aware of 
their weaknesses.  
 
DC, in turn, uses the different strategies a bit more evenly, though the evenness mostly comes 
from the comparison that both GB and NC use the ‘hinder / block’ -strategy very actively. DC 
most often chose to use the strategy ‘criticise’, followed by ‘hinder / block’, and thirdly 
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‘associate with a negative aspect, personalise’. Interestingly, these are the same strategies that 
GB uses, only in a different order. This might tell us that these strategies are very useful in a 
debate, but the choice can depend on the power relations between the debaters as well as 
personal preferences. 
 
Finally, NC also uses the strategy ‘hinder / block’ most frequently, followed by ‘disassociate 
from the other’ and ‘challenge’. The most interesting part of his profile is the very active use 
of ‘disassociate from the other’ -strategy, which he uses considerably more than the other two. 
As already discussed above, it most likely comes from the need to stand out as a viable option 
next to the two conventional choices for votes.  
 
According to Sky News (Chung 2010, Fitzgerald 2010, Richardson 2010), polls published 
immediately after the debates declared NC the winner of the first debate, DC and NC to tie 
the second debate, and DC to win the final debate. Thus, it could be argued that the strategies 
chosen by DC and NC have aided them in presenting their views in such a way that the 
audience were convinced. Naturally, it is impossible to say based solely on those figures how 
persuasive the actual debates have been, but since people were polled immediately after the 
televised debates, it is likely that they have made a difference.  
 
All in all, all of the strategies that manifested in the data are quite natural for this context. 
Being able to challenge, criticise and highlight the differences of the opponents as well as 
insisting on discussing the controversial topics are all necessary aspects in the battle for the 
votes, and holding the floor and mocking the adversary are efficient tools for doing that. It 
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would be interesting to see if the same categories emerge in other debates, especially if the 
debate is held in another culture.  
 
4.3. Is impoliteness in a formal context still impoliteness? 
 
In chapter 2 I discussed the theories of Bousfield (2008) and Mooney (2004) on what 
constitutes impoliteness. According to these researchers, when determining impoliteness 
elements such as the type of face threat, speaker intention, aggression, and implicational 
impoliteness need to be taken into consideration. This sub-section will examine these 
elements in relation to this data. 
 
Bousfield (2008: 72–73) argues that in order for impoliteness to be successful, it must be 
understood as impoliteness by all the interlocutors. This condition is fulfilled in impoliteness 
in a formal context. A context such as a political debate does limit what can be said, and thus 
limits the amount of impoliteness strategies available for the speaker, but conveying 
impoliteness is still possible. For instance, when DC criticises GB and the Labour government 
and says, 
[23] Obviously, with the terrible situation we have in our public finances, with the mess left by 
Gordon and Labour, where out of every £4 the Government spends, £1 is borrowed, it’s not 
possible to make great big tax giveaway promises.  
 (Debate 3, p. 5) 
There is no question about that being intended and interpreted as impolite.  
 
Another aspect of impoliteness is aggression. Bousfield (2008, discussing Hydén’s 1995 
theories) talks about two aspects of aggression; verbal and physical. In this data, there are 
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signs of verbal aggression, to a degree. The debaters do get frustrated, and lose their patience 
on a few occasions, though they still sustain the formal register. For example: 
[24] GB: I do seem to be right. David did not mention free eye tests.  
DC Well let me do it right now. We’ll keep them. Let me challenge you. Will you now 
withdraw the leaflets… Will you withdraw the leaflets that are going around the country 
saying that the Conservatives would take away things like the free bus pass? You know, 
you really should be ashamed of doing things like that.  
 (Debate 2, p. 19)   
 
This may feel somewhat more subdued in just a written form, but from the video footage it 
was quite clear that DC was upset and aggressive during this exchange. The second aspect, a 
threat of physical violence, however was not present. This can be seen as one central 
difference between informal and formal context impoliteness. In the latter, physical violence 
is very rare, as it would break the context of social formality.  
 
Culpeper (2010, Ch. 5) also suggests that some instances of impoliteness do not follow the 
formula he presented in his earlier (1996) article, but that impoliteness can be also be 
regarded as form-driven, convention-driven or context-driven. As I already mentioned in 
chapter 2, elements of these can be found from the impoliteness strategies and Bousfield’s 
(2008) work, but I do agree that they are an interesting viewpoint. They offer a more detailed 
viewpoint on many of the impoliteness strategies, and the convention-driven aspects of 
impoliteness are especially clearly prevalent in a formal context as well. Additionally, what 
should be taken into consideration is Harris’ (2001) view on the institutionalised settings and 
a Community of Practice, which helps to define the success of impoliteness. For instance, 
face threats may be seen differently in formal and informal contexts, as the debaters represent 
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both themselves and their party in the debates, and thus both themselves as well as the party 
are attacked. 
 
All in all, based on the findings in this data I would argue that some of the impoliteness 
strategies and conventions of impolite speech are used in a formal context, and they fit into it 
quite naturally. The register dominates certain things, such as what kind of strategies can be 
convincingly used, but there is still room for individual variation, as we can see from the 
differing ways the three debaters use impoliteness strategies. Conclusions will be presented in 
the following chapter.  
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5. Conclusions 
 
This study examined the use of impoliteness strategies in a formal, political context. 
Impoliteness is traditionally associated with highly informal speech and situations where the 
interlocutors are not constrained by specific rules of conduct, but this study, drawing 
inspiration from the works of Harris (2001), and Garcia-Pastor (2008) aimed to discover how 
well will Culpeper’s (1996, Culpeper et al. 2003) and Bousfield’s (2008) model of 
impoliteness modify under the constraints of a more formal register of speech.  
 
I set out to look for how individual impoliteness strategies, complied by Culpeper (1996) in 
his model of impoliteness, with some additions from Bousfield (2008), manifested in the three 
leaders’ debates held in Britain before the previous General Election in 2010. The data 
consisted of three 90-minute-debates, where Gordon Brown, David Cameron and Nick Clegg 
debated the questions posed by members of the audience. Each debate was moderated. I 
hypothesised that I would not find instances of some of the cruder impoliteness strategies, but 
that some of the strategies would prove to be well suitable for debates. Additionally, I wanted 
to see if the debaters choose similar strategies or if their debating techniques differ in this 
aspect, and if it can be convincingly justified that linguistic impoliteness has a role in a formal 
context.  
 
The results revealed that from the list of 20 impoliteness strategies, the debaters used seven of 
them, and additionally there were a few instances of miscellaneous strategies that did not fit 
into any of the 20 options. The emerging strategies also fulfilled the original hypothesis of the 
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more informal strategies such as ‘use taboo words’ or ‘call the other one names’ being 
unlikely to emerge, and the strategies that did occur, such as ‘criticise’ and ‘hinder / block’ fit 
more comfortably into the formal context. All of the strategies that manifested in the data 
seemed natural tools for a political debate. There also proved to be statistically significant 
differences between the ways the debaters used the strategies, suggesting that both the power 
relations between the debaters as well as personal output styles affect what kind of strategies 
each debater chooses to apply. The fact that a considerable amount of impoliteness strategies 
were found from the data, and that they all fit logically into the nature of political debate, 
support the idea that this side of impoliteness is worth looking into, and that it can be 
convincingly analysed using the same set of parameters as with the more conventional, 
informal side of impoliteness. It could even be argued that it is better to use the same set of 
strategies for both formal and informal contexts of impoliteness, as this allows a possibility 
for a continuum and a chance to explore how and to what extent the informal and formal sides 
of impoliteness differ from each other. While this study is not extensive enough to allow 
absolute generalisations, it helps to validate the purpose of studying impoliteness in a formal 
context.  
 
The hindrance of this study is the threat of subjectivity. The categorisations of the instances of 
impoliteness are based on my own evaluation, though I have attempted to study the examples 
and definitions of Culpeper and Bousfield in great detail in order to follow their 
classifications. Yet, every researcher is bound to draw slightly different conclusions when 
categorising the data. I hope that the examples I have provided persuade the reader that the 
categorisations are appropriate. The use of both quantitative and qualitative methods of 
analysis also aims to offer a more detailed view of the data set, and to prove that not only can 
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instances of impoliteness be found in a more formal register of communication, but that 
people can use the strategies differently, due to differences in power relations and personal 
debating styles. 
 
Impoliteness is a very vast field, and there are a lot of approaches available. One element that 
I would have liked to look into is Bousfield’s (2008) idea about the more complex realisation 
of impoliteness: the combinations of impoliteness strategies and strategies spanning over a 
longer piece of dialogue. In this study, I only looked at individual strategies and studied 
impoliteness on a rather simple level, but in the future it would be interesting to see how the 
debaters combine strategies, and if specific strategies appear together frequently. Another 
viewpoint is how the impoliteness strategies manifest within the discussion on one topic. 
Additionally, it would be interesting to find out if a different database or a more varied data 
would present similar results. Some of the impoliteness strategies that I expected to find in the 
data were not used, and I would like to know if it is just the case of this data, or if those 
strategies just do not belong to this range of linguistic impoliteness.  
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Appendix 1 
 
Table 1: Raw data, number of instances in individual debates, strategies 1–8. 
1. Disassociate from the other 
2.  Seek disagreement or avoid agreement 
3. Condescend, scorn, ridicule, use sarcasm 
4. Associate with a negative aspect, personalise 
5. Criticise 
6. Hinder / block 
7. Challenge 
8. Miscellaneous 
GB - 1 DC -1 NC -1 GB - 2 DC - 2 NC - 2 GB - 3 DC - 3 NC - 3 
3 0 20 0 12 10 4 4 10 
1 5 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 
2 4 5 6 4 7 1 5 9 
6 8 1 11 5 4 11 12 5 
2 6 12 4 13 12 12 20 4 
38 21 23 29 7 32 6 5 17 
15 11 9 12 2 13 18 7 7 
0 1 0 0 3 2 0 2 0 
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Table 2: Raw data, total number of instances 
GB - 
total 
DC - 
total 
NC - 
total total hits 
7 16 40 63 
3 5 3 11 
9 13 21 43 
28 25 10 63 
18 39 28 85 
73 33 72 178 
45 20 29 94 
0 6 2 8 
   
Table 3: Total word count in all three debates: 
GB DC NC All 
17014 16985 16730 50729 
 
Table 4: Normalised data, per 1000 words 
GB DC NC 
all 
instances 
0,411 0,942 2,39 1,242 
0,176 0,294 0,179 0,217 
0,528 0,765 1,255 0,848 
1,645 1,472 0,598 1,242 
1,057 2,296 1,674 1,676 
4,29 1,943 4,304 3,509 
2,644 1,178 1,733 1,853 
0 0,353 0,12 0,158 
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SUOMENKIELINEN TIIVISTELMÄ 
 
 
Pro gradu -tutkielmassani tarkoitukseni oli selvittää millaisia kielitieteellisen 
epäkohteliaisuuden strategioita on löydettävissä muodollisessa kontekstissa. Tutkimalla Iso-
Britanniassa vuonna 2010 järjestettyjä puoluejohtajien välisiä vaaliväittelyjä pyrin 
määrittämään millaisia epäkohteliaisuusstrategioita voidaan luontevasti käyttää väittelyssä, 
jonka muodollinen rekisteri asettaa rajoituksia ilmaisun epäkohteliaisuudelle. Hypoteesini oli, 
että tietyt strategiat, kuten sopimattomien ilmaisujen käyttäminen tai toisen sulkeminen 
ulkopuolelle vaikeatajuisten sanojen tai aihepiirien avulla eivät palvele puhujia tässä 
yhteydessä, tai niiden käyttö koetaan muodolliselle kontekstille soveltumattomaksi. Sen sijaan 
oletin, että osa strategioista, kuten vastaväittelijän huomiotta jättäminen, pilkkaaminen ja 
keskeyttäminen olisivat varsin käyttökelpoisia myös tällaisessa tilanteessa.   
 
Kohteliaisuus ja epäkohteliaisuus ovat nykyisin varsin tutkittu osa-alue sosiolingvistiikassa 
(ks. esim. Locher ja Bousfield, 2008: 2). Tutkimusala lähti liikkeelle kohteliaisuuden 
tutkimuksesta 1970-luvulla, muun muassa Gricen (1975), Leechin (1983) ja Brownin ja 
Levinsonin (1978, tutkimusta tarkennettu 1987) toimesta. Epäkohteliaisuus nähtiin aluksi 
kohteliaisuuden sivutuotteena tai vaihtoehtoisesti vastakohtana. Epäkohteliaisuutta ei 
myöskään aluksi nähty tietoisena ja tavoitteellisena keskustelun osana, vaan se koettiin 
enemmänkin vahingossa tapahtuvaksi. Nykyään ollaan kuitenkin tultu siihen tulokseen, että 
vaikka epäkohteliaisuutta ei voida nähdä kommunikoinnin yleislähtökohtana, sillä on 
kuitenkin keskeinen osa ihmisten välistä vuorovaikutusta, ja sille on oma tarkoituksellinen 
aikansa ja paikkansa. Epäkohteliaisuus voi olla jopa koko keskustelun tavoite. (Bousfield 
2008: 51). Epäkohteliaisuutta on myös tutkittu useasta eri näkökulmasta, muun muassa 
poliittisen kontekstin kautta (esim. Mills 2001, Harris 2005, Terourafi 2008), semantiikan 
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yhteydessä (mm. Culpeper 2011, Schneider 2012, Waters 2012) ja kasvojen, eli kuvan omasta 
itsestä sosiaalisissa tilanteissa, säilyttämisen tai menettämisen kannalta (esim. Spencer-Oatey 
2007).  
 
Tämän työn kannalta keskeisimmät tällä alalla tehdyt tutkimukset ovat Culpeperin (1996, 
2005, 2010, ja Culpeper et al. 2003) ja Bousfieldin (2008) käsialaa. Pro gradu -tutkimukseni 
lähtökohtana käytin Culpeperin (1996) luomia epäkohteliaisuusstrategialistoja, joita Bousfield 
on sittemmin tarkentanut. Culpeper (1996) määrittelee viisi superstrategiaa 
epäkohteliaisuudelle (vapaasti suomennettuna): 
 
- suora, kiertelemätön epäkohteliaisuus 
- positiivisiin kasvoihin (tarpeeseen olla hyväksytty, arvostettu, ja ryhmän jäsen) 
kohdistuva epäkohteliaisuus 
- negatiivisiin kasvoihin (tarpeeseen toimia itsenäisesti ja vapaasti) kohdistuva 
epäkohteliaisuus 
- sarkasmi tai teennäinen kohteliaisuus, joka on selkeästi tulkittavissa 
epäkohteliaisuudeksi 
- kohteliaisuuden välttäminen tilanteessa, jossa se olisi tarpeellista 
 
Lisäksi Culpeper tarkentaa positiivisiin ja negatiivisin kasvoihin kohdentuvaa 
epäkohteliaisuutta listaamalla niille tuotantostrategioita (vapaasti suomennettuna).  
 
Positiivisiin kasvoihin kohdistuvia tuotantostrategioita ovat: 
- jätä toinen huomiotta 
- sulje toiminnan tai keskustelun ulkopuolelle 
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- pyri erottautumaan toisista 
- ole välinpitämätön ja epäystävällinen 
- puhuttele asiayhteyteen sopimattomalla tavalla 
- käytä epäselvää tai salailevaa kieltä 
- pyri erimielisyyteen 
- tee toisen olo epämiellyttäväksi  
- käytä sopimatonta kieltä 
- nimittele 
 
Negatiivisiin kasvoihin kohdistuvia strategioita puolestaan ovat:  
- pelottele 
- alennu, halveksu, pilkkaa 
- häiritse toisen omaa tilaa (kirjaimellisesti tai kuvallisesti) 
- yhdistä kielteiseen piirteeseen ja henkilökohtaista 
- muistuta (kiitollisuuden)velasta 
 
Bousfield (2008: 125–132) lisää oman tutkimuksensa pohjalta listaan seuraavat strategiat ja 
tarkennukset:  
- vältä yksimielisyyttä – tukemaan ja laajentamaan strategiaa ’pyri erimielisyyteen’ 
- uhkaile – lisäyksenä strategiaan ’pelottele’ 
- kritisoi 
- häiritse / estä 
- pakota vaihtamaan sosiaalista roolia 
- haasta 
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Tämä tutkimus rakentui näiden strategioiden ympärille. Aineistosta etsittiin erityisesti 
positiivisiin ja negatiivisiin kasvoihin suuntautuvia epäkohteliaisuuden ilmauksia, sillä ne 
ovat yksityiskohtaisimpia ja siten parhaiten kategorisoitavissa. Toki huomioon otettiin myös 
superstrategiat, ja näistä myös sarkasmia löytyi väittelijöiden puheesta. 
 
Lisäksi vaaliväittelyjä tutkittaessa on syytä ottaa huomioon poliittinen konteksti. Kuten Harris 
(2001) toteaa, epäkohteliaisuuden tutkimuksen painotus on tavallisesti epämuodollisessa 
ilmaisussa, sillä siellä epäkohteliaisuus ilmenee yleisimmin ja luontevimmin. Hän kuitenkin 
ehdottaa, että muodollisempia konteksteja tarkastellessa keskustelu tulisi nähdä erillisenä 
käytäntöyhteisönä (Community of Practice) joka määrittää omat sääntönsä siitä, millainen 
käytös on hyväksyttävää. Esimerkiksi tässä aineistossa vaaliväittelyn tuoma muodollinen 
konteksti tarkoittaa sitä, että kaikki Culpeperin ja Bousfieldin määrittämistä strategioista eivät 
istu käytäntöyhteisön säädösten sisälle, ja vaikkapa asiayhteyteen sopimattomalla tavalla 
puhutteleminen ei kävisi päinsä.  
 
Tutkielman aineistona oli kolme televisioitua vaaliväittelyä, jotka järjestettiin Iso-Britanniassa 
huhtikuussa 2010. Väittelyt pidettiin viikon välein, ja niihin osallistui Britannian kolmen 
suurimman puolueen, Työväenpuolueen, Konservatiivien ja Liberaalidemokraattien 
puheenjohtajat Gordon Brown (maan senhetkinen pääministeri), David Cameron ja Nick 
Clegg.  Parlamenttivaalit järjestettiin viikko viimeisen väittelyn jälkeen. Jokainen väittely 
kesti 90 minuuttia, ja jokaisessa väittelyssä oli puheenjohtaja, joka jakoi puheenvuoroja ohjasi 
keskustelujen aiheita kutsumalla yleisön jäseniä esittämään kysymyksiä. Väittelyistä oli 
tarjolla sekä litteroinnit että videomateriaalia (ks. lähteet).  
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Aineiston tutkimuksessa lähtökohtana oli ensin kaikkien epäkohteliaisuustapausten 
merkitseminen ylös, ja sen jälkeen niiden kategorisointi Culpeperin (1996) ja Bousfieldin 
(2008) luomien listojen pohjalta. Lisäksi tapaukset jaoteltiin väittelijäkohtaisesti. Tavoitteena 
oli paitsi hahmottaa millaisia epäkohteliaisuusstrategioita tästä aineistosta löytyy, myös 
selvittää käyttävätkö väittelijät strategioita samalla tavalla, vai suosivatko he eri strategioita. 
Väittelijöiden välisiä eroja tarkasteltiin myös tilastollisesti. 
 
Epäkohteliaisuustapauksia luokitellessa kävi ilmi, että aineistosta löytyi seitsemää eri 
kategoriaa edustavia strategioita. Nämä strategiat olivat: 
- pyri erottautumaan toisista  
- pyri erimielisyyteen tai vältä yksimielisyyttä  
- alennu, halveksu, pilkkaa, käytä sarkasmia  
- yhdistä negatiiviseen piirteeseen ja henkilökohtaista  
- kritisoi 
- häiritse / estä 
- haasta 
 
Lisäksi muutama ilmaus ei sopinut mihinkään alkuperäisistä kategorioista, ja ne merkittiin 
yhteisnimikkeellä sekalaiset. Sarkasmin käyttäminen on Culpeperin (1996) teoriassa erillinen 
strategia, mutta koska se ilmentyi aineistossa vain kolme kertaa joista jokainen istui myös 
’alennu, halveksu, pilkkaa’ -kategoriaan, sarkasmi integroitiin samaan. Eri aineistossa 
sarkasmin käyttö saattaa ilmentyä toisenlaisella tavalla, mutta tähän yhteyteen yhdistäminen 
sopi. Sekalaisen kategorian ilmaisut puolestaan vaikuttivat samankaltaisilta, ja antavat 
alustavia viitteitä siihen, että epäkohteliaisuusstrategioiden listaan voisi mahdollisesti lisätä 
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yhden uuden kategorian; vähättele. Aineistosta ei kuitenkaan löydy tarpeeksi tämän tyyppisiä 
ilmaisuja, jotta asia voitaisiin sanoa varmaksi.  
 
Kävi myös ilmi, että väittelijät suosivat eri strategioita. Gordon Brownille tyypillisimmät 
strategiat olivat häiritse / estä; haasta; ja yhdistä henkilökohtaiseen piirteeseen ja 
henkilökohtaista. Hänellä tuntui olevan suurin tarve keskeyttää vastaväittelijänsä tai esittää 
välihuomautuksia muiden puheenvuorojen keskellä. Kaksi muuta Gordon Brownille 
tyypillistä strategiaa johtuvat mahdollisesti valta-asetelmasta. Väittelyjen aikana Gordon 
Brown oli vallassa oleva pääministeri, jonka valta-asemaa kahden muun suurimman puolueen 
johtajat yrittivät horjuttaa. Brown puolestaan pyrki luomaan yleisölle kuvaa siitä, etteivät 
vastaväittelijöiden puoluelinjat olisi äänien arvoisa.  David Cameron puolestaan suosi 
epäkohteliaisuusstrategioita kritisoi; häiritse / estä; ja yhdistä negatiiviseen piirteeseen ja 
henkilökohtaista, joskin hän käytti kaikkia aineistossa ilmenneitä strategioita varsin tasaisesti. 
Nick Clegg poikkesi kahdesta muusta väittelijästä erityisesti siinä, että hän käytti runsaasti 
strategiaa ’pyri erottautumaan toisista’. Tämä johtunee siitä, että Clegg pyrki esittämään 
puolueensa uutena ja tuoreena vaihtoehtona kahden perinteisen sijaan, jolloin selkeän eron 
korostaminen puoltaa yleistä väittelystrategiaa. Omia tarkoitusperiä palvelevien syiden lisäksi 
eri epäkohteliaisuusstrategioiden valintaan vaikutti todennäköisesti myös omat mieltymykset 
väittelytyylissä. Jollekin sopii paremmin vastaväittelijöiden keskeyttäminen ja oman kannan 
siten esille tuominen, kun taas toiselle on luontevampaa haastaa vastaväittelijät kritisoimalla 
ja kyseenalaistamalla. Jokainen vaaliväittelijä kuitenkin käytti jokaista aineistossa esiintyvää 
epäkohteliaisuusstrategiaa, lukuun ottamatta sitä, että Gordon Brown ei käyttänyt yhtään 
strategiaa joka kuuluisi ylimääräiseen sekalaista-kategoriaan.  
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Aineistosta löytyneet epäkohteliaisuusstrategiat vaikuttavat varsin tyypillisiltä vaaliväittelyn 
keinoilta. Koska vaaliväittelyn tavoitteena on vakuuttaa potentiaaliset äänestäjät paitsi siitä, 
että itselle ja omalle puolueelle kannattaa antaa ääni, myös siitä, että kilpailevien poliitikkojen 
ajatukset ja puoluelinjaukset ovat puutteellisia, vääriä tai muuten huonosti esitettyjä. 
Tällaiseen yhteyteen vastaväittelijän haastaminen, kritisointi ja hänen heikkouksiensa esiin 
tuominen istuvat mainiosti, ja tällaiset epäkohteliaisuusstrategiat ovat luontevia, jopa 
odotettavissa olevia. Samoin puheenvuoron itselleen omiminen ja vastustajan pilkkaaminen 
soveltuvat useimpiin väittelytilanteisiin. Voidaankin sanoa, että aineistosta löytyneet 
epäkohteliaisuusstrategiat ovat kaikki luonnollisia elementtejä tässä kontekstissa.  
 
Muun muassa Mooney (2004) ja Bousfield (2008) ovat pohtineet sitä, millaisia elementtejä 
vaaditaan, jotta epäkohteliaisuus toteutuu. Näihin vaatimuksiin kuuluu muun muassa se, että 
epäkohteliaisuuden tulee olla sekä tarkoituksellista että epäkohteliaisuudeksi ymmärrettyä. 
Tämä toteutuu vaaliväittelyissä, vaikka kaikkein suorimmat ja tylyimmät epäkohteliaisuuden 
ilmaisut eivät yleensä ole käytössä muodollisessa – kontekstihan muuttuu epämuodolliseksi 
esimerkiksi kiroilun tai nimittelyn myötä – kontekstissa, mutta epäkohteliaisuudesta oli silti 
ilmiselvästi kysymys. Tyypillistä epäkohteliaisuustilanteissa on myös aggressio. 
Muodollisessa kontekstissa tämä esiintyy lähinnä suullisessa muodossa, fyysisen aggression 
uhkaa ei missään vaiheessa ollut väittelyssä havaittavissa, ja se vaikuttaakin jälleen enemmän 
epämuodollisen kontekstin ilmiöltä. Epäkohteliaisuuden toteutumisen suhteen on myös syytä 
ottaa huomioon Harrisin (2001) näkemys käytäntöyhteisöistä, eli yhteisö määrittää sen, millä 
ehdoilla epäkohteliaisuus toteutuu.   
 
Tutkimuksessa kävi ilmi, että Culpeperin (1996) ja Bousfieldin (2008) laatimasta 
kahdenkymmenen mahdollisen epäkohteliaisuusstrategian joukosta aineistosta löytyi 
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ilmaisuja, jotka sopivat seitsemään näistä kategorioista. Lisäksi mukana oli muutama 
sekalaisten kategoriaan luokittuva ilmaisu. Väittelijät suosivat eri strategioita, ja heidän 
strategiavalintojensa välillä oli tilastollisesti merkittäviä eroja. Se, että aineistosta löytyi 
varsin paljon epäkohteliaita ilmauksia jotka myös sopivat luontevasti kontekstiin puhuu sen 
puolesta, että epäkohteliaisuutta sekä epämuodollisessa että muodollisessa kontekstissa 
voidaan määrittää samojen strategialuokitusten avulla. Tämä tukee ajatusta, että 
epäkohteliaisuutta on mielekästä tutkia erilaisissa konteksteissa. Koska tämä tutkimus 
keskittyi ainoastaan yksittäisten strategioiden tarkasteluun, jatkossa olisi mielenkiintoista 
tutkia sitä, miten eri strategioita yhdistellään keskenään tai esimerkiksi yhden aihepiirin ajan. 
Voisi myös olla mielenkiintoista selvittää, ovatko nämä strategiat kulttuurisidonnaisia. 
Jatkotutkimukselle on siis lukuisia eri mahdollisuuksia. 
 
 
